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Executive Summary 
The extraordinary diffusion of computers and information technology (IT) in the 
past 20 years has prompted interest in the implications of IT for employment levels, 
workplace skill demands, and earnings levels and inequality. This interest has centered on 
a number of questions: 
 
• Does IT eliminate more jobs than it creates? 
• Is there a shortage of IT professionals? 
• Does the spread of computers explain the significant growth in wage inequality 
in the United States in the past 20 years by altering the occupational 
distribution of employment and/or the skill content of occupations themselves? 
 
Periodically, fears arise that automation will lead to mass unemployment. These 
fears find little support in available data, which show robust and nearly uninterrupted 
growth in employment between 1948 and 2000. During the boom years of the late 1990s, 
when IT penetration of the economy was greater than ever before, the nation’s overall 
unemployment rate fell to its lowest levels in 30 years. 
 
Some have expressed concern over perceived shortages of IT professionals. 
Although spot shortages would not be surprising in the booming technology sector of the 
late 1990s, researchers disagree as to whether a genuine shortage existed. In addition, 
because the share of IT professionals as a percentage of the overall workforce is relatively 
small, any such shortage would have only a limited effect on the general labor market. 
 
The greatest concern raised in recent academic studies over the effect of IT is its 
possible contribution to the growth in earnings inequality observed since the late 1970s. 
The theory of skill-biased technological change (SBTC) argues that computers have 
increased the demand for skill in the general workforce and created a more broadly felt 
skills shortage, bidding up the relative wages of the more skilled. The theory remains 
controversial because others believe that different structural and institutional factors have 
played a larger role in increasing earnings inequality than demand shifts or a shortage of 
human capital. 
 
The precise means by which computers might increase job skill requirements and 
earnings inequality is debated even among advocates of the SBTC theory. Computers can 
increase the skill demands within occupations in several ways:  
 
• Learning to operate the equipment and software may require scarce skills, 
which increases the wage gap between more- and less-educated workers 
(computer-specific human capital). 
• Because a computerized workplace involves the manipulation of symbols and 
information, employers may demand more conceptual, abstract reasoning, and 
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problem-solving skills of their workers. This development might also 
encourage employers to restructure work in ways that broaden job duties and 
give these employees more autonomy and decision-making responsibility 
(general human capital—computer users).  
• Computerization within an organization may increase skill requirements and 
wages even for jobs that do not involve directly working with computers 
because of organization-wide changes in practices that result from 
computerization (general human capital—computer users and nonusers).  
 
Computers can also increase the demand for skill and relative wages by altering 
the distribution of workers between occupations. This can occur by stimulating the growth 
of high- and medium-skilled jobs—not only the IT professionals who manage the 
technology, but also accountants and production planners who analyze the information it 
generates—or by automating less-skilled jobs out of existence, such as data entry clerks. 
 
A large body of literature explores each of these possible causal pathways. 
Although many studies support the SBTC theory, others find the evidence for skill-biased 
technological change fragile and dependent on strong assumptions. Much has been 
learned about the diffusion of computers and IT and the pattern of wage inequality 
growth, but their possible interrelationship remains unclear and contested. 
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Chapter 1:  Introduction 
The rapid and widespread diffusion of computers and information technology (IT) 
at the workplace is one of the most notable trends of the past 20 years. This development 
has prompted both a great deal of excitement that IT might serve as an engine of growth 
and prosperity and also great concern that its effects on employment and job skill 
requirements have increased economic inequality. Many feel that IT is the hallmark of an 
Information Revolution as far-reaching as the Industrial Revolution of the previous 
century, with profound consequences for employment, earnings, well-being, and the 
economy and society in general even as debate and uncertainty continue over its exact 
implications. This report reviews principally the economics literature on the relationship 
among computers and related technologies; employment, skill, and wage levels; and 
inequality, drawing on other fields when technology and wages, human capital, or 
employment are discussed. Some significant related work is beyond the scope of this 
project, including important sociological literature on technological change and the 
deskilling of jobs as well as studies of the connections among technological change, 
changes in organizational structure (often referred to as "postbureaucratic" organizations), 
and social institutions (except as they relate directly to changes in workers' skills and 
wages). Additional research focusing only on IT's implications for organizational 
structure is outside the scope of this report (for a review, see Brynjolfsson and Hitt 2000).  
 
This review primarily focuses on three principal questions: 
 
• Does information technology eliminate more jobs than it creates, even leading, as 
some fear, to mass unemployment? 
• Does a shortage of IT professionals exist? 
• Does the spread of computers explain the significant growth in wage inequality in 
the United States in the past 20 years, either by:  
⇒ changing the character or skill content of occupations through various 
mechanisms, regardless of changes in the distribution of workers across 
occupations; or 
⇒ changing the occupational composition of employment through differential 
worker displacement and job creation processes, even if there is no impact 
on overall labor demand?  
 
The rest of this review discusses historical, theoretical, and methodological issues 
involved in these debates and then addresses these questions in order, with particular 
attention given to the literature on whether IT has significantly increased the demand for 
skill and caused the recent increase in U.S. earnings inequality, known as the theory of 
skill-biased technological change (SBTC). In principle, the shortage of IT professionals 
might be considered an aspect of the changing occupational composition of employment, 
but in practice advocates of SBTC have made a much broader argument about the 
changing occupational structure and the two issues have been debated on separate tracks. 
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Chapter 2:  Historical Perspective 
Technological change is not new. Both manufacturing and nonmanufacturing 
industries have been the subject of dramatic technological change over time. The 
Industrial Revolution eliminated many traditional occupations in textiles, and subsequent 
changes in production technologies continued to alter the job content and occupational 
structure of all industries long before the emergence of computer technology. In perhaps 
the most dramatic example, roughly 38 percent of the U.S. labor force was employed in 
agriculture in 1900, but only about 6 percent were employed in that sector by 1960, and 
that figure has since stabilized at about 2 percent as a result of mechanization and other 
technological innovations (Handel 2000).  
 
Concern over technology's impact is also not new. As early as the 18th century, 
economists and other observers debated the implications of new technology for 
employment and economic well-being (Woirol 1996, pp. 17 ff.). Although the 
contemporary perception is that the changes associated with IT are unprecedented, the real 
question is not the fact of change but the relative magnitude, speed, and consequences of 
that change compared to prior patterns of change. Some perspective on the current 
situation can be gained from understanding previous concerns regarding employment and 
technological change.  
 
The first modern debate over the effects of technology occurred just before and 
during the Great Depression. The publication of the first firm government productivity 
data in 1926–27 showed both unexpectedly rapid gains and declining employment in 
certain manufacturing sectors. The recession of 1927 heightened concern in the popular 
press about a possible association between increased productivity and declining 
employment, but the Depression greatly magnified such concerns (Woirol 1996, pp. 23 
ff.). Economists conducted case studies of plants or industries to understand the fates of 
workers displaced by technology, usually in manufacturing, often finding extended 
periods of unemployment and income loss for affected workers even during the 1920s, but 
the data did not permit generalizing from these cases to the economy as a whole (Woirol 
1996, pp. 30 f., 48 f.). Other economists performed simple statistical comparisons of 
trends in output, employment, and productivity in different manufacturing industries to 
determine whether a connection existed between improvements in efficiency and declines 
in employment. Prior economic theory suggested that the efficiencies resulting from 
technology would generate sufficient demand to reemploy those displaced, but economists 
agreed that data and methodological limitations made impossible any real understanding 
of the extent to which technology did or did not tend to produce an ever-growing pool of 
persistently unemployed, as distinct from other factors such as trends in firm-specific or 
aggregate demand (Woirol 1996, pp. 47 ff., 75 f.). A number of government-sponsored 
commissions investigated the problem during the Depression but also failed to reach a 
consensus (Woirol 1996, pp. 62 ff.). 
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Quite rapidly, World War II transformed the slackest labor market in U.S. history 
into the tightest, and the issue of technology-generated unemployment disappeared from 
both popular discussion and empirical study among economists (Woirol 1996, p. 69). 
Following World War II, both excitement and concern over technology revived because 
of both technological advances and cyclical fluctuations in unemployment. About this 
time the term automation was coined to describe new, self-acting manufacturing 
technology, such as the automatic feeders and unloaders introduced in a Ford Motor 
Company engine plant. In the 1950s, reports emerged of oil refineries and chemical plants 
that replaced batch production with continuous process technology and reduced labor 
requirements to only five to seven workers who monitored dials, recorded numbers, and 
performed troubleshooting tasks. As many as a thousand designers and manufacturers of 
industrial equipment were in the automation field by 1955, and new trade journals 
appeared. In the early 1950s, the popular and business press began to speak of the 
possibility of a fully automatic factory. Concern was muted initially, but the recession 
following the Korean War and associated unemployment led some to draw a connection 
between job loss and the excitement over automation (Woirol 1996, pp. 77 ff.; and Bix 
2000, pp. 240 ff.). 
 
In the service sector, the introduction of direct-dial service for local telephone 
calls eliminated the need for vast numbers of operators to perform switchboard 
connections, but the dramatic expansion of service meant that overall employment at 
AT&T increased, and large numbers of operators were still required to perform other 
functions. Computers allowed an insurance company, studied by the Labor Department in 
1955, to reduce its central clerical staff from 198 to 85, but nearly all of those displaced 
were transferred to other jobs within the company with the same earnings, and most of the 
rest left through natural processes of attrition during the 2-year transition period. 
Similarly, around this time Bank of America introduced magnetic ink character 
recognition technology that made it possible for machines to sort checks, track 
transactions, and print statements with just 9 operators instead of 50 bookkeepers, 
according to one account. Other scanning technology was in development at the time, 
raising the possibility of a virtually paperless operation that would render typists, clerks, 
and bookkeepers obsolete, but Bank of America anticipated that the consequent expansion 
of the business would allow existing employees to be transferred to other positions (Bix 
2000, pp. 242 f., 275). 
 
Some viewed the contemporary enthusiasm surrounding automation as hyperbolic, 
but others were concerned about the possibility of widespread layoffs and technological 
displacement, leading Congress to hold hearings on the subject in the late 1950s. Labor 
leaders expressed concern over whether growth could keep pace with technological 
advances to ensure the reemployment of displaced workers and whether older workers 
could be easily retrained. Business executives argued that increased efficiency would 
generate growth sufficient to absorb any workers whose jobs were eliminated and that the 
technology itself would require more highly skilled maintenance workers and create new 
occupations, such as technicians and computer programmers. The Bureau of Labor 
Statistics conducted case studies of automation's effects in particular offices and factories. 
The resumption of output and employment growth in the mid-1950s caused this debate to 
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be less heated than similar debates during the Depression (Woirol 1996, p. 164; and Bix 
2000, pp. 243 ff.). 
 
However, concern revived between 1957 and 1964, when the economy slowed and 
unemployment increased sharply and remained stubbornly high (see figure 2). John F. 
Kennedy ran for president on a platform of revitalizing the economy and gave the issue 
prominence. He created an Office of Automation and Manpower in the Labor Department 
in 1961; appointed a high-level commission to examine the issue; and enacted an 
education and retraining program for displaced workers, the 1962 Manpower 
Development and Training Act (Woirol 1996, pp. 77 f.; and Bix 2000, pp. 258 ff.). In 
1962, Kennedy identified "the major domestic challenge of the Sixties—to maintain full 
employment at a time when automation, of course, is replacing men" (Woirol 1996, p. 
96). 
 
In labor relations, a national rail strike was narrowly averted in 1963 over 
complaints by owners that unions were featherbedding by requiring that crews continue to 
use firemen to stoke boilers even after the switch from steam to diesel. A typographers' 
strike shut down New York's publishing industry for nearly 4 months that same year in a 
dispute over new typesetting equipment. In 1964, the New York longshoremen's union, 
anticipating the effects of cargo containerization and mechanization on labor demand, 
won a guaranteed income for senior members regardless of the need for their services; 
indeed, the number of longshoremen moving cargo for the New York–New Jersey ports 
declined by 75 percent between 1966 and 1975 even as the tonnage of cargo handled 
increased more than 20 percent. As one longshoreman recalled, "Automation just killed 
us." The business and popular press weighed the promise and perils of automation, with 
some predicting that, by the early 1980s, computers would perform all jobs except for the 
work of technicians required to operate them. In 1963, the Senate held hearings on the 
"Nation's Manpower Revolution" to consider the issue (Woirol 1996, pp. 84, 95 f., 100; 
and Bix 2000, pp. 259 ff., 270).  
 
Around this time economists coined the term structural unemployment to describe 
involuntary unemployment that did not reflect the business cycle or traditional patterns of 
temporary job loss or search. Structural unemployment was believed to be concentrated in 
particular occupations, industries, or regions as a result of long-term shifts in the 
economy, such as changes in production technology or consumer spending patterns. 
Others added nonwhites, women, and young people to the groups experiencing structural 
unemployment. In 1962, advocates of the structural unemployment concept articulated a 
new technology acceleration hypothesis that would be recognizable to contemporary 
proponents of skill-biased technological change theories: increasingly rapid technological 
change such as automation created a significant barrier to absorbing segments of the 
unemployed by accelerating the shift in labor demand toward more-skilled and white 
collar workers. Charles Killingsworth testified at the 1963 Senate hearings that 
"automation appears to be spreading more rapidly than most major technological changes 
of the past" and that "the fundamental effect of automation on the labor market is to 'twist' 
the pattern of demand—that is, it pushes down the demand for workers with little training 
while pushing up the demand for workers with large amounts of training" (Woirol 1996, 
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pp. 103 f.). He noted that it was the unemployment and labor force participation rates of 
noncollege-educated males that showed the most significant deterioration between 1950 
and 1962 and consequent evidence of labor surplus, as advocates of SBTC would later 
argue was the case in the 1980s and 1990s. Others questioned the quality of the data and 
analyses on which these conclusions were based (Woirol 1996, pp. 104 ff., 121). 
 
Proponents of the structural unemployment concept argued that reducing overall 
unemployment would be insufficient to assist these groups and that more targeted 
programs were needed to address the mismatch between existing job vacancies and those 
unemployed or out of the labor force who, for various reasons, were unable to take 
advantage of them. However, a debate soon developed as a more prominent group of 
economists argued that the problem was simply slow growth and that fiscal and monetary 
policies that lowered aggregate unemployment by stimulating demand would be sufficient 
to absorb the less-skilled and other disadvantaged workers. This group favored the 
administration's 1964 tax cut, an early and well-publicized effort to consciously manage 
the economy through fiscal policy (Woirol 1996, pp. 79 ff., 95, 97 f., 100 ff.).  
 
In 1965, President Lyndon Johnson appointed a National Commission on 
Technology, Automation, and Economic Progress, which concluded that the main cause 
of high unemployment was slow economic growth, not technological change. However, 
by the time the report was issued, the point was moot; economic growth had resumed in 
earnest. By 1965, the tax cut and growing government spending led to a sharp decline in 
unemployment and a booming economy for the rest of the decade. Popular and academic 
concern with automation and structural unemployment largely evaporated, repeating the 
experience of the Depression and World War II periods (Woirol 1996, pp. 111, 127). 
 
In both the 1930s and early 1960s, popular concern helped fuel government 
inquiries and professional debates, but most economists believed that the problem of 
technology-induced unemployment had been overstated in both cases, although others 
took a contrary view. In both cases the debate faded not because of convincing research 
findings or expert consensus but because of increased economic activity (Woirol 1996, 
pp. 8 f.).  
 
As in previous periods, the deep recession of the early 1980s prompted concerns 
over the effects of new technology, leading a joint committee of the National Academy of 
Sciences, National Academy of Engineering, and the Institute of Medicine to create the 
Panel on Technology and Employment. The panel examined the effects of technology on 
overall employment levels, job displacement, the occupational distribution of 
employment, skills, wages, and emerging training and education requirements (Cyert and 
Mowery 1987, pp. 209 f.). The panel concluded that technology is a modest contributor to 
job loss, skill upgrading, stagnant earnings, and inequality growth and cited slow 
economic growth and perhaps trade as more likely culprits (Cyert and Mowery 1987, pp. 
viii, 60 f., 86). The panel noted the existence of similar fears about the effects of 
technology during the Depression and the late 1950s–early 1960s period and how they 
faded when full employment returned (Cyert and Mowery 1987, pp. 87 ff.). The overview 
of the technical papers accompanying the report acknowledged that the evidence on the 
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effects of new technology on employment and skills is "extraordinarily weak" (Cyert and 
Mowery 1988, p. xxxiii). 
 
The historical record reminds us that, in some sense, we have already been here 
before. Anxiety and sweeping claims about the effects of technology are not new, 
although they have often been undersupported with evidence and, in retrospect, 
exaggerated.  
 
In both earlier debates, there was a strong tendency to confuse technological 
displacement with weakness in overall demand, which is also known to affect less skilled 
workers most severely. The early mechanization/automation controversies and the high 
unemployment rates that occasioned them faded from view considerably when the 
business cycle reversed and growth resumed. Clearly, technology is only one of many 
variables affecting employment and the labor market, and it is not at all obvious that it is 
as significant as macroeconomic conditions. However, this does not negate the possible 
hardships experienced by disadvantaged groups or those adversely affected by structural 
changes in the economy, even during periods of expansion, who may require targeted 
efforts such as retraining, job placement assistance, or extended support. 
 
This qualification implicitly recognizes—and the case studies of worker 
displacement in both the 1920s–30s and 1950s–60s confirm—that technology is a genuine 
force for change in the labor market that cannot easily be dismissed. However, by the 
same token, these cases remind us that similar examples of technology-induced change 
that could be cited today are not unique and, insofar as these case studies are compelling 
evidence of technological effects in the past, they beg the question as to what is distinctive 
about more recent developments. Case studies are vital for understanding concrete 
processes and mechanisms of change in a way that statistics fail to capture, but it is 
difficult to generalize from them or use them to construct historically consistent indexes 
of technological impacts either within or across industrial sectors. Case studies cannot 
answer questions about whether the pace of technological change and its effects have 
accelerated over time. At best, case studies are only suggestive evidence of historical 
variations in the pace of technological change. 
 
One of the most notable features of previous debates was the weakness of the 
empirical evidence on both sides. At no point in either debate could anyone determine 
precise levels of technological unemployment beyond individual cases or anecdotes, nor 
could anyone separate the effects of technology from potentially unrelated changes in 
aggregate or firm-specific demand; however, that did not prevent participants from 
drawing strong conclusions (Bix 2000, pp. 242, 245, 256). When debates ended it was not 
because theory or data resolved them; interest simply faded when economic conditions 
improved (Woirol 1996). 
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Chapter 3:  Conceptual Issues: Theory, Methods, and 
Nature of Information Technology 
 
Theoretical Perspectives 
 
Many of the issues raised in previous debates are still relevant to an examination 
of IT’s relationship to the workforce. The effects of computer technology on employment 
must be distinguished from the effects of the business cycle, fluctuations in firm-specific 
demand, and other changes that may be unrelated to technology, such as growth in 
imports and offshore production. If IT represents an unprecedented economic 
development, one must show not only change but also an accelerated pace of change 
relative to the past. Similarly, the quality of the evidence remains an important concern.  
 
For present purposes, IT can influence labor markets in three ways: it can affect 
the total number of jobs regardless of skill level or occupation, it can alter the skill mix of 
jobs through changes in occupational demand, and it can alter the skill mix of jobs 
through changes in the skill content of occupations without necessarily changing the 
occupational distribution.  
 
A great deal of public concern has always focused on the question of whether 
technology is eliminating the need for human labor in general. The most extreme version 
of this idea argues that the future economy will require virtually no workers, causing 
massive unemployment and idleness (Aronowitz and DiFazio 1994; and Rifkin 1995). 
This concept implies a somewhat paradoxical vision of an economy so efficient that it has 
no way to distribute its abundant output because everyone is out of work; it is hard to see 
how businesses could continue to produce vast quantities indefinitely in the absence of 
paying customers (i.e., earners). A more modest version of this idea, with greater support 
among economists, holds that technology may result in a more limited net job loss or 
persistent job shortage, in which a certain fraction of the labor force faces long-term 
unemployment even when the economy is expanding. This issue of "jobless growth" has 
received some support and attention in the Western European experience (OECD 1996, 
pp. 62, 68). 
 
The principal objection to the thesis of a jobless future is that technology-induced 
efficiencies lower prices and give consumers more wealth, which they can use to increase 
their consumption of goods or services, including those whose price has dropped. In this 
case, increased productivity translates into increased output and employment, assuming 
that producers do not have monopoly power to maintain prices and reap all the gains from 
these improvements and that consumers increase consumption rather than save their new 
wealth. Expansion in the industries responsible for the new labor-saving technologies 
(e.g., computers) will also increase employment (OECD 1996, p. 9 ff.; and Cyert and 
Mowery 1987, pp. 1 f.). 
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The problem with this view is that there is no reason in principle why the number 
of jobs created would necessarily fully offset those that are lost. However, most 
economists derive some confidence from the empirical record, which generally has not 
supported the more extreme predictions of technological unemployment that have been 
advanced since the Industrial Revolution. 
 
However, even those who do not believe that IT poses a threat to overall 
employment recognize that there is less reason to assume that labor-saving efficiencies 
will be exactly balanced by increased labor demand for particular categories of workers. If 
consumers use money saved from price declines in one industry to buy goods or services 
provided by another industry, the jobs created may be very different from those that are 
lost, and some workers may suffer the kind of structural unemployment described 
previously. If labor demand does fall for some groups, employment levels can be 
maintained only at the cost of lower wages (OECD 1996, pp. 10 ff.). Thus, technology 
may not dramatically reduce overall labor demand, but it may alter the composition of 
employment or the type of labor demanded.  
 
Some believe that this describes recent trends in employment and wages. Wage 
inequality has grown dramatically in the past 20 years, and many economists believe that 
computer technology has played a significant role in this process by reducing demand for 
less-skilled workers, some of which is manifest in declining employment for the less 
skilled (Katz and Murphy 1992; Krueger 1993; Berman, Bound, and Griliches 1994; 
Danziger and Gottschalk 1995; and Autor, Katz, and Krueger 1998). Proponents of this 
view argue that computer technology is skill biased rather than skill neutral. The skill-
upgrading effects of computers are not intrinsically problematic—they promote less 
physically demanding and more mentally challenging work—but the theory of skill-
biased technological change (SBTC) states that the pace of change is so rapid that the 
demand for skill has outstripped the ability of the labor supply to meet it and has widened 
wage differentials. 
 
Although economists generally do not frame the issue this way, the nature of the 
evidence makes it useful to distinguish two ways computers may increase the demand for 
skill (for an exception, see Howell and Wolff 1991). Computers can affect the 
occupational composition of employment by either eliminating low-skilled jobs through 
automation or increasing the number of medium- and high-skilled jobs, such as computer 
programmers or white collar workers, needed to analyze the increased number of reports 
that a computerized workplace generates. Alternatively, computers may increase the skill 
content of an occupation—for example, if IT is difficult to learn or requires greater 
abstract reasoning abilities—without necessarily altering that occupation's share of the 
workforce. These two mechanisms—changes in the occupational composition and the 
skill content of occupations—will be referred to as between-occupation and within-
occupation effects (Spenner 1983, 1979). The distinction is important because different 
studies address one or another of these processes under the common rubric of "skill-
biased technological change" without mentioning that they are making different 
assumptions about causal mechanisms with distinct evidentiary requirements. In 
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particular, data on between-occupation effects are more readily available than for within-
occupation effects, and one should be aware of the data’s limitations. However, the 
distinction is also a useful way to clarify the concrete mechanisms whereby computers 
may affect skill demands. Thus, there are three principal questions for this review: 
 
• Does IT eliminate more jobs than it creates, even leading to mass unemployment? 
• Does IT increase the demand for skill by changing the occupational composition 
of employment through differential worker displacement and job creation 
processes, even if there is no overall effect on labor demand?  
• Does IT increase the demand for skill by changing the character or skill content of 
occupations, regardless of changes in their relative proportions? 
 
Methodological Issues 
 
Three serious methodological issues impede deeper understanding of IT's impact 
on work and the labor market.  
 
First, measures of information technology are imperfect. Before the 1980s, most 
measures of any kind of technology were indirect, such as productivity, the value of 
capital invested, the level of spending on research and development, and the percentage of 
scientific and technical personnel or the percentage of nonproduction workers in an 
industry. One exception is the time series for investment in office, computing, and 
accounting machinery and computer investment in manufacturing produced by the U.S. 
Department of Commerce, which has been used for a few studies (Berman, Bound, and 
Griliches 1994; and Autor, Katz, and Krueger 1998). Beginning in 1984, the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics' Current Population Survey (CPS) also periodically asked employees 
about computer use at work, but the results of research using these data have proven 
controversial. Other direct measures of information technology, such as factory 
automation, are even more scarce (Doms, Dunne, and Troske 1997).  
 
Second, even when measures of information technology appear reasonable, great 
difficulty exists in drawing firm causal inferences between trends in IT on the one hand 
and trends in employment, skills, and wages on the other. Problems include potential 
spuriousness owing to omitted variables that affect both the presence of IT and 
employment characteristics, difficulty distinguishing cause from effect and possible two-
way causation, and various empirical anomalies.  
 
Third, other than broad occupational categories, there are few direct measures of 
job skill requirements besides those derived from the Dictionary of Occupational Titles 
(DOT), published by the Employment and Training Administration of the Department of 
Labor in 1977. Most of the DOT job ratings were collected in the late 1960s and 1970s 
and can be used to measure between-occupation effects after merging them with Census 
or CPS data. In the absence of more recent ratings, there is no way to trace trends in the 
skill content of occupations over time or correlate them with trends in computer use, so 
investigating potential effects of IT within occupations for a national sample is 
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problematic. Trends in education and wages have been used as indirect measures of job 
skill demands, but a job holder's education is a personal characteristic, not a direct 
measure of job complexity, and wages are potentially affected by variables other than skill 
shifts, such as international trade, unionization, the minimum wage, and macroeconomic 
conditions. 
 
These limitations of data and method, as well as the ambiguities of certain results, 
contribute to the debates over the effects of IT on the labor market. 
 
A Brief Description of Information Technology 
 
Although many economists use the term technology to refer to any aspect of the 
organization of production, this review uses a narrower and more intuitive definition. 
Information technology, or IT, refers to capital equipment that makes extensive use of 
microelectronics and programmed instructions or software. A number of distinct 
characteristics are often associated with IT, although not all apply to all hardware and 
software. IT systems are frequently fast, precise, high storage, high capacity, highly 
flexible, reprogrammable, and automatic or self-acting. They may be able to record, 
process, communicate, and react to information from users and feedback from the 
environment in more or less sophisticated ways. Many systems have only a subset of these 
abilities, but the novelty and power of these characteristics are undoubtedly a large part of 
the reason for the attention and excitement over IT. 
 
Prominent examples of IT specific to manufacturing, repair, and similar blue collar 
environments include numerically controlled and computer numerically controlled 
machine tools; robots; computerized diagnostic and testing equipment; onboard computers 
in automotive vehicles; automated telecommunications switching equipment and 
controllers; sensors; manufacturing process controls, such as programmable logic 
controllers; automated material handling equipment; automated inventory and parts 
storage and retrieval systems; automated guided vehicles; computers for monitoring, 
analyzing, and controlling industrial processes; factory local area networks (LANs); 
computer-aided design and manufacturing (CAD/CAM); material resource planning 
software to manage supplies and inventory; and flexible manufacturing systems that 
integrate automated machining, material handling, and delivery systems (Doms, Dunne, 
and Troske 1997; Zuboff 1988, pp. 418 ff.; and Siegel 1999, pp. 46 ff.). 
 
Prominent applications of information technology in office and service-sector 
environments include common desktop software such as word processors, spreadsheets, 
databases, e-mail clients, and Internet browsers; personal digital assistants and other 
handheld devices; videoconferencing and distance learning technologies for training and 
education; onboard computers in police vehicles and trucks for information exchange and 
remote database access and monitoring; data entry and transactions processing systems 
(e.g., payroll, billing, bank transactions, and insurance claims); other forms of record 
management (e.g., medical records); paper sorting systems (e.g., mail sorters); computer 
programming; LANs; CAD; graphic design and printing; automated teller machines; bank 
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networks for electronic funds transfer; electronic data interchange for automated ordering 
and payment between purchasers and suppliers; barcode scanners; point-of-sale devices; 
and inventory management devices and software.1 
 
Clearly, computer and microelectronic technologies have developed diverse 
applications, some of which save more labor or require more skill to use effectively than 
others. Any consideration of the effect of information technology on the labor market 
ultimately rests on some plausible account of the effects of these specific and similar 
systems on the number and types of workers they displace and on the skill requirements 
for operating them or working in a computerized environment. 
 
When considering IT's impact, product complexity must be distinguished from 
process complexity. Most people who use electric devices or drive automobiles do not 
have a sophisticated understanding of their underlying principles. The fact that the 
equipment is sophisticated does not mean that all processes that involve interfacing with 
that equipment require high levels of skill. The manufacture of complex products, such as 
computers, may require minimal skill in some labor-intensive stages, such as final 
assembly, and may require minimal skill to operate in certain contexts, such as data entry. 
Whether high-technology equipment is associated with high-technology or highly skilled 
jobs is an empirical question. 
 
                                                 
1 These examples are largely independent of the additional examples that could be cited of embedded 
microchips found in many other devices, such as electronic cash registers or videocassette recorders, which 
are not computer systems in the same sense as the others listed. 
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Chapter 4:  The Public’s Views of Information 
Technology’s Impact on Work 
 
 
The attitudes of workers and the general public toward IT’s effects on 
employment may or may not reflect personal experience with technology in the 
workplace, but they are important for understanding popular concerns regarding the 
issue. These attitudes are often positive, but they also include concerns about societal 
impacts and other problems among those personally affected.2 As will be clear, most of 
the questions deal with concerns about job loss rather than skill shifts. 
 
As early as 1965, a Harris poll revealed that more than half of the respondents 
believed that automation raised unemployment rates, whereas 38 percent thought it 
resulted in better and cheaper consumer goods. Among skilled and unskilled blue collar 
workers, 14–16 percent felt at risk of job loss because of automation, whereas only 4 
percent of managerial and professional workers thought similarly (Bix 2000, pp. 273 f.). 
 
As table 1 indicates, the Survey of Working Conditions (1969) and the Quality of 
Employment Survey (1972–73) found that, about 30 years ago, 16–22 percent of workers 
believed that machines and computers were at least somewhat likely to perform many of 
their job tasks in the next few years, but only about 15 percent of those workers (about 
3.5–5 percent of all workers) anticipated that this would result in job loss rather than 
continued employment in their current position or internal transfer (Handel 2000). 
 
A Roper poll (1980) found that 72 percent of adults thought that computers had 
made life at least somewhat better, and only 23 percent felt that computers had any 
negative effects. In the same poll, 30 percent said that computers keep prices down and 
"free workers from drudgery and give them more time to do creative things," but even in 
1980, 38 percent thought that "too many people had lost their jobs because they have 
been replaced by computers." 
 
In a sample of registered voters responding to a Time/Yankelovich poll (1982), 52 
percent thought that computers "will throw a lot of people out of work" and 51 percent 
thought that they will "take a lot of satisfaction out of jobs." 
 
When asked in a Harris poll (1984) about "the increased use of information-
processing systems, such as computers or word processors," 43 percent of adults said that 
they will worsen unemployment and 50 percent said that they will help create jobs. 
 
                                                 
2 Unless otherwise noted, these poll results are derived from the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research 
database of survey data, available through the Lexis-Nexis Internet database service. Precise question 
wording and tabulations of responses are available from the author. 
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Table 1. Percentage of Workers at Risk for Job Loss Due to Technology: 
1969 and 1972–73 
 1969 1972–73  1969 1972–73 
Probability of       
Technology Impact 1      
Very likely 8.0 9.7    
Somewhat likely 8.0 12.0    
A little likely 9.9 11.1    
Not at all likely 74.2 67.2    
      
N 1, 320 1, 268    
      
 All  At Risk Only 3 
Consequences 2      
Out of job 3.5  4.7  14.2 14.6 
Other job, same employer 9.0 11.7  36.3 36.5 
Job adapted to machine 11.8 15.4  47.4 48.4 
Other 0.5  0.2   2.2  0.5 
Not affected by 
technology 
75.2 68.1  -- -- 
      
N 1, 311 1, 254  325 390 
Source: Survey of Working Conditions (1969), Quality of Employment Survey (1972–73). Figures for 1972–
73 use sample weights; those for 1969 are self-weighted. From Handel (2000). 
 
1 Based on responses to question: "How likely is it that in the next few years, machines or computers will be 
doing a lot of the things you now do on your job?" 
2 Based on responses to question, "If this happens, would you be out of a job, or would your employer find 
something else for you to do, or would your job just be adapted to the machine or computer, or what?" Small 
percentage responding "don't know" excluded. 
3 "At risk" excludes those responding "Not at all likely” to previous item. 
 
 
A Roper poll (1986) found that 54 percent of adults thought the use of industrial 
robots on assembly lines should be "severely limited," whereas only 21 percent thought 
they should be "greatly expanded." In the same poll, 63 percent thought that if robots 
were used, unemployment would increase and retraining would not be sufficient to 
address the problem. Similar questions asked during a recession year (1982) elicited 
responses that were about 10 percentage points more negative. 
 
A Gallup poll (1989) found that 52 percent of adults thought that robots would 
replace most assembly line workers by the year 2000.  
 
The 1998 General Social Survey conducted by the National Opinion Research 
Center asked respondents whether new types of technology such as computers and robots 
will increase or decrease the number of jobs over the next few years and whether new 
technology will make work more interesting. Tables 2 and 3 suggest that about 50 
percent think that IT will reduce employment to a greater or lesser degree and about 40 
percent think that IT will increase employment, but nearly 70 percent think that IT will 
make work more interesting (author's calculations). 
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Table 2. Effects of Computers, Robots, and 
Other Technology on the Number of Jobs 
in Next Few Years: 1998 
Greatly increase 16.47  
Slight increase 21.42  
No difference 11.61  
Slightly reduce 29.61  
Greatly reduce 20.88  
  
N 1,111 
Source: General Social Survey (1998). Author's calculations. 
 
 
Table 3. Will New Technologies Make Work 
More Interesting in Next Few Years: 1998 
Much more 31.27  
A little more 36.83  
No difference 20.07  
A little less  7.80  
Much less  4.03 
  
N 1,116 
Source: General Social Survey (1998). Author's calculations. 
 
 
A 1999 survey sponsored by National Public Radio, the Kaiser Family 
Foundation, and Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government found that 87 
percent of adults under 60 thought computers were making life better for Americans. 
About a third believed computers in the workplace would decrease the number of 
available jobs (see table 4), but only 13 percent were concerned they might lose their own 
job in the future as the result of technological advances (5 percent were very 
concerned)—numbers remarkably similar to those in the Survey of Working Conditions 
(1969) and Quality of Employment Survey (1972–73) (see table 1). By contrast, 43 
percent thought computers would increase employment and 23 percent thought they 
would not make much difference. About 40 percent thought computers would increase 
wages and 20 percent thought they would decrease wages, while another 40 percent 
thought they would make no difference (see table 4). However, 45 percent said they 
thought computers widened "the gap in income and opportunity between the haves and 
have-nots in our society," whereas 11 percent thought computers narrowed the gap and 
39 percent thought they made no difference (National Public Radio, Kaiser Family 
Foundation, and Kennedy School of Government 2000, pp. 20 ff.).  
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Table 4. Effects of Computers on Employment and Wages: 1999 
 Increase Decrease No difference 
    
Employment 43 32 23 
    
Wages 39 19 39 
Source: National Public Radio, Kaiser Family Foundation, and Kennedy School of 
Government 2000, p. 22. 
 
 
Although the survey record suggests a significant division of opinion between 
those who are generally optimistic and those concerned about possible job displacement, 
only about 15 percent of respondents believe their own jobs are at risk, a figure that 
appears to have remained stable over the past 30 years. 
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Chapter 5:  Technology and Trends in 
Overall Employment 
 
As noted previously, predictions that technology would lead to the wholesale 
elimination of jobs and mass unemployment have persisted for many years, particularly 
during the automation debates in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Few academic 
economists take such predictions seriously, partly because of the theoretical reasons 
discussed earlier and partly because of the U.S. record of employment growth. 
Nevertheless, this prediction regained attention recently in the context of the dramatic 
spread of computers, which led some to claim that high technology destroys more jobs 
than it creates and that employment growth is not sufficiently rapid to offset this 
displacement (Aronowitz and DiFazio 1994, pp. 1 ff., 21).  
 
Although he does not cite specific figures, Jeremy Rifkin, writing in the mid-
1990s, described the economy as being in a "jobless recovery" in which continued layoffs 
and downsizing and increased numbers of permanently displaced workers foreshadowed 
"massive unemployment" and a "near workerless, information society" (Rifkin 1995, pp. 
xv ff., 5, 59). Although most economists would find this view exaggerated, two 
prominent trade economists, Paul Krugman and Robert Lawrence, claim that "the 
concern, widely voiced during the 1950s and 1960s, that industrial workers would lose 
their jobs because of automation, is closer to the truth than the current preoccupation with 
the presumed loss of manufacturing jobs because of foreign competition" (quoted in 
Rifkin 1995, p. 8). 
 
Rifkin argues that the full displacement effects of automation during the 1950s 
and 1960s were suppressed by government spending on military, public works, and social 
programs and the introduction of new consumer products and services, all of which 
maintained demand and reabsorbed labor. In his view, limits on government spending 
and restructuring and automation in service industries mean that there will be no similar 
source of labor demand in the future, and employment in IT industries themselves will 
remain too small to compensate for the displacement that will result. Rifkin comes closer 
to the structural unemployment view when he argues that remaining jobs will have high 
educational requirements that limit the retraining and reemployment possibilities for 
workers displaced from less-skilled blue collar and white collar jobs (Rifkin 1995, pp. 32 
ff.).  
 
Although it is hard to disentangle all of the variables Rifkin invokes, some 
perspective on the question of "the end of work" can be gained by examining trends in 
employment.3 Figure 1 shows that between 1948 and 2000, total employment more than 
doubled from less than 60 million workers to more than 135 million workers, with some 
                                                 
3 All data are from the Economic Report of the President (Executive Office of the President 1989, 2000). 
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sign of a modest acceleration since 1970. These numbers give no indication of a jobless 
or workerless economy. These statistics do not adjust for declines in hours worked since 
World War II, but there is general agreement that most of this decline ceased by the early 
1970s and represented a gain in leisure time for workers that most viewed as a benefit 
rather than as a form of involuntary underemployment (Schor 1991). 
 
Figure 1. Total Employment: 1948–2000
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Source:  Economic Report of the President (1989, 2000), Washington, DC: Government Printing Office.
 
 
Even if the number of jobs is not falling in an absolute sense, a growing job 
shortage may exist relative to the number of job seekers. Figure 2 shows that the 
unemployment rate tended to rise to higher levels during each recession since the 1950s 
and remained relatively high during the 1970s and 1980s. However, the long expansion 
of the 1990s broke this pattern, and unemployment dropped steadily to its lowest level 
since the boom of the late 1960s. By 2000, unemployment was only 4 percent, a level 
bettered only in the 1951–53 and 1966–69 periods. Rifkin's (1995) prediction of massive 
unemployment appeared just as the economy drove unemployment to levels not seen in 
30 years.  
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Figure 2. Unemployment Rate: 1948–2000
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Nor is it the case that declining unemployment merely represents withdrawal from 
the labor force among those displaced. Figure 3 does not suggest any dramatic declines in 
the employment/population ratio over time, except for the trend toward earlier retirement 
for men when incomes were rising, which few attribute substantially to technological 
displacement. 
 
Contrary to Rifkin's assertion, some evidence indicates that IT as a share of total 
investment across seven OECD nations is positively related to total and service sector 
employment growth between 1985 and 1995, although other data suggest a negative 
relationship between productivity growth and manufacturing employment growth for a 
larger set of countries (OECD 1998, pp. 50 f.). 
 
The economics literature on skill-biased technological change raises more serious 
concerns that the buoyant growth in overall employment masks employment declines for 
less-skilled workers. Some believe that the lower wages accompanying the lower 
employment rates among less-skilled workers are another indication of declining demand 
for these workers. If wages did not decline, employment would have fallen even more. 
Indeed, with the exception of the last few years of the late 1990s boom, the real wages of 
production and nonsupervisory workers has remained stagnant or declined slightly since 
1973 after growing roughly 75 percent between 1947 and 1973 (U.S. Department of 
Labor 1999; and author's calculation from Executive Office of the President, Economic 
Report of the President, various issues). 
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Figure 3. Employment/Population Ratio: 1948–2000
(persons age 16 and over)
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Chapter 6:  Trends in Demand for  
Information Technology Workers  
 
Although the growing number of IT professionals might be the most obvious sign 
of the computer’s effect on occupational distribution and the demand for skill, the 
research on skill-biased technological change (SBTC) and inequality has not specifically 
been concerned with IT workers. In fact, a number of researchers have been careful to 
specify that the SBTC thesis refers to IT effects that extend beyond IT occupations and 
industries (Autor, Katz, and Krueger 1998, p. 1186; Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson, and Hitt 
1999, p.13, 2002; and Levy et al. 1999, p. 7).  
 
However, good reasons exist for examining IT employment in particular. 
Traditional arguments against the technological unemployment thesis cite job gains in the 
industries supplying new technology as a way to offset employment gains, and 
employment growth in the IT sector has attracted popular attention. Employment gains 
for highly skilled workers and job losses for less-skilled workers within this sector may 
also illustrate some of the processes of SBTC, even if the full implications of this process 
require taking a broader view. Finally, during the late 1990s boom, many were concerned 
that the United States faced a shortage of IT workers, which stimulated a debate over 
relaxing limits on nonimmigrant work visas for engineers, computer scientists, and other 
highly skilled technology workers. Thus, although the issue is largely tangential to the 
academic debate over SBTC, employment and wage trends in the IT sector itself have 
attracted interest for a number of reasons. 
 
In the late 1990s, most attention focused on concerns about a shortage of highly 
skilled IT workers. The Census Bureau has traditionally used two or three relatively 
broad categories to measure trends in these occupations. Tabulations using the Current 
Population Survey (CPS) indicate that the percentage of all U.S. workers who were 
computer scientists and computer systems analysts grew from 0.10 percent in 1971 to 
0.35 percent in 1982 to 1.16 percent in 1997, whereas the corresponding figures for less-
skilled computer programmers were 0.25 percent (1971), 0.47 percent (1982), and 0.56 
percent (1997). Combined, these workers still accounted for less than 2 percent of total 
employment in 1997 (Handel 2000, p. 266).  
 
Interestingly, although the percentage of computer scientists and systems analysts 
accelerated in the late 1980s, the share of programmers did not, perhaps because of the 
spread of prepackaged software, end-user programming (software features that allow 
users to perform operations that previously required programmers), improvements in 
program design, object-oriented programming using reusable modules of code, 
automation of code writing, and the use of offshore programmers, particularly from India 
and Ireland (Occupational Outlook Quarterly 1992; Stremlau 1996; U.S. Department of 
Commerce 1997, pp. 11, 16; Ó Riain 1997, 2000; U.S. Department of Commerce 1999, 
pp. 22, 27; and National Research Council 2001, pp. 63 f., 127). U.S. Department of 
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Labor projections confirm that the future expansion of programming jobs will be 
relatively slow and comparable to the growth rate of the workforce overall, although 
relatively high turnover rates in these jobs will create more vacancies than otherwise 
projected (U.S. Department of Commerce 1999, p. 26, 28).  
 
Even allowing for the undercounting of some scientists, mathematicians, 
engineers, and technicians working in the computer hardware and software industries, 
highly skilled IT occupations still represent a relatively small part of total employment.4 
Any difficulty satisfying employer demand for IT workers must be considered a spot 
shortage rather than evidence of a more general problem. 
 
Still, the industry is widely seen as pivotal to recent U.S. economic performance 
and receives considerable attention. In 1997, a survey of medium and large firms 
conducted by the Information Technology Association of America (ITAA) found that IT 
companies had about 190,000 unfilled IT professional jobs in 1996 because of a shortage 
of qualified workers; this shortage represented the most significant bottleneck for IT 
company growth (U.S. Department of Commerce 1997, pp. 3, 20; and Freeman and 
Aspray 1999, p. 15, 1997, pp. 3, 20). A similar ITAA study in 2000 estimated that 
425,000 IT jobs went unfilled, but the study also defined IT workers somewhat more 
broadly than later discussions; it included more than 7 percent of the workforce, 
including those with primary training from proprietary technical schools and vendor 
certificate programs (www.itaa.org/workforce/studies/01execsumm.htm). Despite 
possible problems with the quality of the study, the initial ITAA report stimulated further 
study and debate. 
 
A U.S. Department of Commerce study generally supportive of ITAA's concern 
found that the number of new computer science degrees awarded increased dramatically 
during the 1970s and especially between 1978 and 1986, rising from about 5,000 in the 
early 1970s to 50,000 in 1986 before declining somewhat in the late 1980s and flattening 
out to about 35,000 per year in the early 1990s. This stagnation raised concerns about the 
level of America's technical education (U.S. Department of Commerce 1997, p. 13; and 
U.S. Department of Commerce 1999, pp. 37 f.). Although this rate of degree production 
would seem to fall far short of the 190,000 vacancies anticipated by the 1997 ITAA 
survey, that study appears to define IT professionals more broadly than the Census 
Bureau defines them.  
 
Another problem with linking the number of undergraduate computer science 
degrees awarded with the number of IT job vacancies is that only an estimated 31 percent 
of IT professionals actually have a degree in an IT field, although another 27 percent 
have a degree in another engineering, math, or science field, and many who have IT 
degrees do not work in IT occupations. Indeed, despite the decline in the number of IT 
degrees awarded since 1986, the employment of IT professionals nearly doubled by 
                                                 
4 Although the computer hardware industry employs workers at all skill levels, it has never accounted for 
as much as 1 percent of total employment, reaching a peak of 0.85 percent in 1985 before declining to 0.57 
percent in 1997, according to CPS tabulations (Handel 2000, p. 176). 
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1995. The picture is clouded further by the fact that many with undergraduate degrees in 
other fields enter IT occupations after taking selected college, community college, 
proprietary school, or vendor courses or acquiring IT skills through self-study or work 
experience. In the mid-1990s, slightly more than 9,000 associate’s degrees were awarded 
in IT-related fields per year, although this figure does not include those who completed 
nondegree courses and shorter certificate programs. Although some believe that 
vocationally oriented programs may be more flexible in responding to current and fast-
changing industry needs than 4-year universities, there is also concern that such 
knowledge is relatively narrow and may not involve the deeper conceptual understanding 
required to meet higher level needs or adapt to future changes (U.S. Department of 
Commerce 1997, pp. 33 ff.; Veneri 1998; Freeman and Aspray 1999, pp. 78 f., 99 ff.; 
U.S. Department of Commerce 1999, pp. 40, 77, 80 f.; and National Research Council 
2001, pp. 230 ff., 247). About one-third of IT professionals (computer scientists, 
computer engineers, systems analysts, and programmers) do not hold a 4-year college 
degree, although the majority of these have had some college education (U.S. Department 
of Commerce 1999, pp. 24, 33). A followup report suggested ways to increase college 
enrollment in IT fields, including improving the image of technical professions; 
providing better information about career opportunities to students, parents, and teachers; 
and strengthening elementary and secondary math and science education (U.S. 
Department of Commerce 1999, p. 55). 
 
The followup Department of Commerce report anticipated that demand would 
remain high. According to projections from the Department of Labor's Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, the number of IT professionals will grow from 1.5 million in 1996 to 2.6 
million in 2006, requiring more than 1.3 million new IT professionals to fill the new jobs 
and replace those vacating positions, about 138,000 new workers per year (U.S. 
Department of Commerce 1999, p. 25). 
 
One proposal that employers advocated to meet their needs was lifting the cap on 
the number of H–1B visas granted to foreign high-technology professionals, which 
allowed them to work in the United States for up to 6 years. Before 1998, the number of 
H–1B visas was capped at 65,000, half of which had been issued to those in IT fields by 
1997. Employee groups opposed raising the cap, arguing that sufficient qualified 
Americans were available to fill any vacancies, but the industry sought to control labor 
costs by hiring cheaper foreign workers. Employee groups also argued that raising the 
cap would reduce the incentive for employers to retrain higher paid older workers and 
actively recruit women and minorities as well as discourage young Americans from 
entering the field, reinforcing dependence on foreign labor. Compromise legislation at 
the end of 1998 increased the cap on H–1B visas to 115,000 for 1999 and 2000 but 
returned it to 65,000 by 2002 and required employers using the program to contribute to a 
scholarship fund for low-income students and attest that they have not laid off or 
bypassed available American workers to hire H–1B visa holders (U.S. Department of 
Commerce 1999, pp. 16 ff.).  
 
In part, the perceived shortage reflects the fast-changing and quite specific nature 
of high-level IT skills and the intense competitive pressures that lead companies to feel a 
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sense of urgency to meet this niche demand. It also prompts companies, particularly 
smaller firms, to seek workers who already have the necessary skills rather than retrain 
more generally skilled IT workers, resulting in high levels of poaching of other firms' 
employees and job-hopping among highly skilled IT workers. This churning is not all bad 
insofar as workers learn by doing; repeatedly moving to more cutting-edge workplaces 
exposes workers to more recent technologies, which can enhance skills and avoid rapid 
skill obsolescence (U.S. Department of Commerce 1999, pp. 1, 9 ff., 86 f.). However, the 
reluctance to retrain can lead firms to simultaneously lay off one type of worker and 
search for another, contributing to perceptions of shortage. The rapid pace of skill 
obsolescence and the need for continual retraining make this a potentially chronic issue 
(Freeman and Aspray 1999, pp. 47, 72). 
 
However, many analysts question whether a shortage of IT professionals ever 
really existed. One report argued that the lack of reliable data on the supply of and 
demand for IT workers prevented any meaningful quantitative assessment of a national 
shortage of IT workers (Freeman and Aspray 1999, p. 56). Trade association data are 
generally less reliable than government data (Freeman and Aspray 1999, p. 124). The 
General Accounting Office (GAO) criticized the original ITAA study for the low 
response rate to its survey (14 percent) and small sample size (n = 271). For all the 
concern ITAA’s report generated, the quality of the evidence was remarkably thin. 
However, a subsequent ITAA study, which seemed to be more sound and had a higher 
response rate, found 346,000 unfilled jobs, an even greater number than the previous 
study (U.S. GAO 1998a; and Levy Economics Institute 1998, p. 5). 
 
Others point to the fallibility of previous forecasts of future demand for other 
occupations, such as a predicted imminent shortfall of scientists and engineers in the late 
1980s that failed to materialize, among others (Levy Economics Institute 1998, p. 8; and 
Freeman and Aspray 1999, pp. 46, 61). 
 
Analyses using more reliable government data call into question the severity of 
any shortage of IT professionals. CPS data show nominal wage growth for IT 
professionals between 1983 and 1998 that is close to that for all occupations and slower 
than that for lawyers and doctors, although the boom years from 1995 to 1998 show some 
change. In the late 1990s, perhaps out of concern over the year 2000 problem, the wages 
of computer systems analysts and scientists significantly outpaced those of other 
professionals, although not the workforce as a whole, and computer programmers saw 
their wages grow significantly faster than all workers and other professionals. However, 
in real terms the wages of IT professionals did not grow significantly between 1989 and 
1997. Private salary surveys in the late 1990s, which often included bonuses and stock 
options, showed greater growth for IT professionals, although the reliability of these 
surveys is often questioned. CPS data indicate that the unemployment rate for IT 
professionals was about 0.5 percentage points below that for all professionals between 
1993 and 1998, falling to about 1.5 percent by 1998. This rate suggests a labor market 
that is tight, but not dramatically tighter than that for all professionals, who were not 
perceived as in critically short supply (U.S. GAO 1998b; Levy Economics Institute 1998, 
p. 5; Veneri 1998; Freeman and Aspray 1999, p. 57; and U.S. Department of Commerce 
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1999, pp. 41 f., 48). Some economists conclude from these data that the tight labor 
market for IT professionals in the late 1990s is mostly another example of the tight labor 
market for all professionals at that time (Lerman 1998). 
 
A comprehensive review of the issue by the National Research Council (2001) of 
the National Academy of Sciences largely replicates previous results regarding wages 
and unemployment rates. The report cautions that the absence of data with more specific 
occupational codes might well obscure shortages for specific skills and occupations and 
the lack of information on stock options and other nonwage compensation might obscure 
broader increases in total compensation. Most notably, the report concluded that the 
existence of H–1B visas probably exerts some downward pressure on wages of domestic 
IT professionals of unknown magnitude, but more intensive use of retrained older, native 
IT professionals would not be sufficient to satisfy demand. The evidence for age 
discrimination is mixed and inconclusive (National Research Council 2001, pp. 142 ff., 
175 ff.).  
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Chapter 7:  The Debate Over Skill-Biased Technological 
Change and Earnings Inequality 
 
Introduction 
 
The main debate over the effects of IT on the labor market is much more general 
than the issue of IT professionals and originates with controversies outside IT.  
 
In the 1980s, Harrison and Bluestone (1988) argued that earnings inequality in the 
United States had grown rapidly because of institutional changes such as:  
 
• sectoral employment shifts from manufacturing to low-wage services,   
• declining unionization rates,   
• the declining real value of the minimum wage,   
• greater use of part-time and temporary workers,   
• increased outsourcing by large firms to low-wage suppliers,  
• the transfer of domestic production to lower wage regions in the United States 
and abroad,   
• increased import competition from low-wage regions such as East Asia and 
Mexico,   
• deregulated product markets in industries such as air travel, telecommunications, 
and trucking, and  
• a philosophical shift on the part of employers following the deep recession of the 
early 1980s to contain or reduce wage costs as a method of maintaining 
competitiveness (Bluestone and Harrison 1982, 1988; Harrison 1994).  
 
Although the conclusions regarding earnings inequality and industrial sectoral 
shifts were drawn from analyses of the CPS and published government data, most of the 
causal explanations were inferred from more impressionistic evidence. 
 
Harrison and Bluestone's thesis engendered controversies that continue to the 
present. Critics in the 1980s took issue with the basic thesis of inequality growth, arguing 
either that there was no genuine growth in earnings inequality or that any such growth 
was temporary, reflecting the recession of the early 1980s, the temporarily high value of 
the dollar that depressed U.S. manufacturing sales, or the recent entry of large numbers of 
lower paid younger workers and women into the labor market. These problems would 
work themselves out in time with an upturn in the business cycle, more realistic exchange 
rates, and the accumulation of experience by workers just beginning their careers. Most 
of these analyses also used the CPS to analyze basic trends in earnings inequality, so 
some of the disagreements with Harrison and Bluestone reflected different interpretations 
of the same data, but some of the causal inferences drawn in these accounts were likewise 
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based on more informal methods (Lawrence 1983, 1984; Rosenthal 1985; McMahon and 
Tschetter 1986; Lerman and Salzman 1988; Kosters and Ross 1987, 1988; and Levy 
1987; for a summary of this early debate, see Loveman and Tilly 1988). 
 
By the end of the 1980s, more rigorous research using the CPS confirmed to the 
satisfaction of a wide spectrum of economists that the growth in earnings inequality in 
the 1980s was genuine, not a measurement artifact, and had outlasted the upturn in the 
business cycle, fall in the dollar's value, and career earnings growth of baby boomers and 
recent female entrants into the labor market. This work demonstrated that earnings 
inequality rose strongly in the 1980s to the highest level in the postwar period. These 
studies also showed that after declining in the 1970s, the education differential grew 
dramatically in the 1980s while the gender gap narrowed. In addition, residual inequality 
grew dramatically, that is, the dispersion of wages grew even after statistically 
controlling for the effects of variables such as education, experience, and gender. 
Because residual inequality is by definition that portion of the overall inequality of wages 
that cannot be explained by measured variables, explanations for the growth of residual 
inequality are necessarily speculative in the absence of additional control variables 
(Bound and Johnson 1992; Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce 1992; Katz and Murphy 1992; Levy 
and Murnane 1992; Murphy and Welch 1992; Danziger and Gottschalk 1995; and 
Gottschalk 1997). Cross-national research using comparable government and other 
national data sets suggested similar trends in some, although not all, other industrialized 
nations (Gottschalk and Smeeding 1997). 
 
Although they confirmed the significance of the trend toward greater labor market 
inequality, none of these studies endorsed Harrison and Bluestone's (1988) explanations 
for the shift. They noted that the education wage premium grew even as the relative 
supply of well-educated workers grew, implying a rising demand for more-skilled 
workers. The cause of this rise in demand was attributed to IT, which was such a visible 
addition in many workplaces. This thrust IT into the center of the debate over the growth 
of earnings inequality, although initial explanations focusing on IT were based simply on 
inference and had little specific evidence to support them. 
 
Some early studies noted that the apparent skills shortage could be due to either 
an acceleration in SBTC or a constant rate of technological change combined with a 
reduced growth of educated labor, caused by smaller cohorts of younger workers and 
relatively stagnant college attendance rates (Katz and Murphy 1992, pp. 50, 69; and 
Murphy and Welch 1993). Less attention has been paid in the literature to adjudicating 
this issue, although SBTC is generally acknowledged as a long-term trend that predates 
the 1980s. Therefore, any such explanation for the dramatic growth in earnings inequality 
during the 1980s and 1990s must show that a new development related to SBTC, either 
an acceleration of the demand shift or deceleration of supply growth, also occurred 
during that time. 
 
The difference between the explanations is significant for interpreting the 
literature reviewed here. The demand-acceleration version of the SBTC thesis 
emphasizes the revolutionary implications of IT and corresponds more to popular belief 
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regarding IT's impact. By contrast, the supply-deceleration version suggests that the skill-
upgrading effects of IT are similar in magnitude to previous periods of technological 
change but coincide with trends in demography and college attendance rates that severely 
constrict the growth of the supply of skilled labor. The former explanation leads one to 
expect that IT has dramatic skill implications, whereas the latter implies more modest 
effects and directs more attention to factors unrelated to technology—such as trends in 
demography, immigration, and educational attainment—that modulate the supply of 
skills rather than the demand for them. In general, most economists have implicitly given 
greater weight to IT as a driver of growth in earnings inequality. 
 
The claim that SBTC explains growing earnings inequality prompted other 
researchers more sympathetic to Harrison and Bluestone's (1988) explanations to conduct 
additional research using the CPS or other government data. Most of their empirical 
findings are not much disputed by the researchers cited above, although the implications 
for explaining earnings inequality are still debated. These studies note that roughly half 
of the growth in earnings inequality represents growth in residual inequality and cannot 
be explained based on observable skill measures (Mishel and Bernstein 1998, p. 310). 
Most inequality growth between 1979 and 1997 occurred in the early 1980s, quite early 
in the IT diffusion process, and inequality remained fairly stable in the 1990s when so 
many advances in IT attracted attention (Howell 1995, 1997; and Handel 2000). Few 
measures of productivity show faster growth during the 1980s compared to earlier 
decades, leading to questions as to why one would expect IT to have a dramatic effect on 
wages during this time (Mishel, Bernstein, and Schmitt 1997). Others have found that 
declines in the minimum wage and declining unionization rates (DiNardo, Fortin, and 
Lemieux 1996) and, to a lesser extent, deregulation in some industries (Fortin and 
Lemieux 1997) have affected the growth of earnings inequality, but these issues are 
outside the scope of the present review. 
 
The research on SBTC proceeded in a number of directions. The first research to 
examine the links among computers, wages, and skills directly was Krueger's (1993) 
study of the large wage premium associated with computer use, which he interpreted as a 
return to knowledge of computer software specifically. The study generated such 
controversy that advocates of SBTC then advanced other arguments and models. They 
claimed that the more significant effect of computers was that they increased the general 
human capital requirements of either computer users or both users and nonusers who 
worked in highly computerized environments because of the greater information 
processing, reasoning, and decision-making abilities now required. Although these 
explanations posited within-occupation changes in job skill content, a separate line of 
research examined whether IT altered the occupational distribution of workers. The 
research relating to these different variants of the SBTC thesis—computer-specific 
human capital, general human capital among computer users, general human capital 
among users and nonusers, and differential job creation and displacement—are reviewed 
in the following sections.  
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The Debate Over the Computer Wage Premium 
 
Before discussing the debate over SBTC further, examining some of the trends in 
computer use over time may be useful. Table 5 presents tabulations from various 
supplements to the CPS on the percentage of all workers using a computer at work and 
the specific tasks for which they use a computer, as well as the annual growth rates 
between surveys. Direct use of computers grew rapidly between 1984 and 1993, rising 
from about 25 percent to about 47 percent of all workers, then rose much more slowly to 
about 50 percent of all workers in 1997. Word processing has always been the most 
widely used single application, followed by spreadsheets, bookkeeping, inventory, and 
databases until 1997, when e-mail became the second most widely used application.  
 
Table 5. Trends in the Percentage Share and Annual Growth Rate of Workers Using 
Computers at Work for Any Task and for Specific Tasks: 1984–97 
 Percentage  Annual Growth Rate 
 1984 1989 1993 1997  1984–89 1989–93 1993–97
Use Computer at Work 25.49 37.92 47.06 50.47  2.49 2.29 0.85 
         
Specific Tasks         
Word Processing  15.14 20.46 28.28   1.33 1.96 
Spreadsheet   8.43 10.81 15.99   0.60 1.30 
Database  10.33 16.16 16.83   1.46 0.17 
         
E-mail  5.83 10.38 23.66   1.14 3.32 
Internet use  n.a. n.a. 16.29   n.a. n.a. 
         
Bookkeeping  9.23 11.10 13.92   0.47 0.71 
         
CAD  3.41 3.44 n.a.   0.01 n.a. 
Programming  7.20 6.11 7.49   –0.27 0.35 
         
Inventory  9.58 11.73 14.28   0.54 0.64 
Invoice  6.19 8.68 11.10   0.62 0.61 
Sales  5.57 6.47 10.27   0.23 0.95 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, October Supplements 1984–97. Author's calculations 
from Handel (2000). All figures weighted. Specific computer task items not asked in 1984. Internet use not asked 
in 1989 and 1993. CAD use not asked in 1997. 
 
 
Additional tabulations not shown here reveal other interesting patterns. White 
collar workers, particularly clerical workers, those with more education, women, and 
whites are significantly more likely to use computers than others. Perhaps contrary to 
stereotype, workers between the ages of 25 and 54 use computers at roughly similar rates 
and are significantly more likely to use computers than workers who are either younger 
or older (Krueger 1993, p. 36; and Handel 2000, p. 282). The rise in computer use and its 
uneven distribution among different segments of the workforce represent potentially 
significant developments. 
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However, initial claims that IT produced a skill shortage that raised inequality by 
driving up the relative wages of more-skilled workers were based on the observation that 
the relative wages of more-educated workers grew in the 1980s at the same time that the 
relative number of such workers also grew, implying some type of demand shift in favor 
of more-skilled workers according to traditional neoclassical economic theory. The task, 
then, was to find direct evidence of a link between IT and wages or skills that would give 
this prima facie case specific support. 
 
The first study to do so was Krueger’s (1993), which pioneered the use of CPS 
supplements with individual-level data on computer use as well as traditional labor 
market information. Krueger found that computer use among wage and salary workers 
rose from about 25 percent in 1984 to about 37 percent in 1989. More important, he 
found that when computer use at work was added to a standard wage regression, 
computer users appeared to earn about 15 percent more than nonusers, controlling for 
education, experience, race, gender, marital status, hours worked per week, union status, 
broad occupational group, and region. When two-digit industry dummies were included, 
the coefficients were closer to a 10 percent differential. The inclusion of the computer 
use variable also explained about 40 percent of the 0.01 growth of the education premium 
between 1984 and 1989. This is a within-occupation account of skill upgrading in that it 
finds that computers have an effect on wages after controlling for other aspects of jobs; 
this study claims to isolate the effects of the introduction of computers on a job's skill 
requirements rather than, for example, on changes in occupational composition as a result 
of more extensive automation of less-skilled occupations. 
 
Krueger (1993) performed a number of checks to test the validity of his results, 
such as testing whether computer use was associated with more prosperous employers or 
preexisting worker quality differences that were also associated with higher wages. 
Although others would argue that economic theory would not predict an observed 
premium because nonusers with (unobserved) computer skills would have to be 
compensated for their human capital just as otherwise similar users were, results 
indicated that home computer users did not receive a wage premium comparable to users 
at work (Krueger 1993, pp. 43 f.). From this and other sensitivity tests, Krueger 
concluded that these preexisting differences did not account for the wage differential 
between computer users and nonusers. This study seemed to provide strong evidence that 
"employees who use computers at work receive a higher wage rate as a result of their 
computer skills" and that the diffusion of computers in the workplace "has significantly 
contributed to recent changes in the wage structure," particularly through its effects on 
raising the rewards for education or skill (Krueger 1993, pp. 37, 55). Krueger proposed 
expansion of computer training as a relatively simple way to reduce inequality. 
 
The study generated a great deal of attention for its apparently clear 
demonstration of a link between computer use and rising earnings inequality using 
nationally representative data, but the initial impression did not last. DiNardo and 
Pischke (1996, 1997) analyzed three nationally representative German government 
surveys from the late 1970s to early 1990s and showed that using calculators, telephones, 
and pens or pencils at work—or even sitting down while working—were associated with 
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premiums comparable in size to those for computer use when each was entered 
individually in a standard wage equation. They argued that the actual productivity 
differential associated with each characteristic was unlikely to produce such similar 
results. Likewise, the large coefficients for working with pens and pencils and sitting at 
work suggested that these variables do not primarily measure scarce, productivity-
enhancing skills, such as the ability to use pencils, sit down, or even use a computer, but 
some unobserved aspect of either human capital or occupational position, for which the 
different measured variables served as proxies. The effects associated with computer use 
remained among the largest when all job characteristics were entered together into a 
wage equation, but DiNardo and Pischke argue that each variable is an imperfect proxy 
for worker ability or type of job, with some picking up this variation better than others. 
They suggested that the relationship between computer use and wages is indeed spurious 
and reflects unobserved heterogeneity in either human capital or occupational position. 
DiNardo and Pischke suggested that technology per se may explain little of the growth in 
earnings inequality in the 1980s.  
 
Even many who supported an SBTC explanation of rising earnings inequality 
found this work effectively debunked the conclusions of the previous research, and 
attention turned toward other ways of specifying a connection between IT and wages or 
skill demands. However, Krueger's (1993) study generated a great deal of further 
research worth reviewing for a number of reasons. 
 
First, the notion that computers or other high-technology equipment requires 
significant skill to operate, which may have increased the wages of those more skilled, is 
among the most straightforward and intuitive accounts of a possible link between IT and 
inequality growth. Indeed, some recent papers continue to cite Krueger's (1993) study as 
support for the SBTC thesis and use similar regression specifications (Black and Lynch 
2000, p. 15 and tables 3 and 4; Cappelli and Carter 2000; and Friedberg 2001, pp. 4 f.), 
and Krueger himself still argues for the original thesis, although less strongly, and he 
acknowledges the importance of DiNardo and Pischke's (1996, 1997) findings (Krueger 
2000, pp. 15 f.). 
 
Second, the wealth of subsequent research on this topic is hard to ignore. 
Krueger's (1993) original study and DiNardo and Pischke's (1996, 1997) response 
stimulated numerous additional studies that are useful to summarize given the interest 
this topic generated. 
 
Third, models that purge coefficient bias by accounting for person or employer 
fixed effects would also speak to other SBTC theories that distance themselves from the 
computer wage premium literature Krueger (1993) initiated, which posit that increases in 
general human capital demands among computer users rather than computer-specific 
skills are the source of SBTC. Because some studies of the computer wage premium do 
incorporate person and employer fixed effects, they speak to the issue of whether 
computer use is associated with skill upgrading regardless of the source. 
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Whereas DiNardo and Pischke used data from Germany, which did not 
experience rising wage inequality in the 1980s, Handel (2000) replicated their central 
findings for the United States using a 1991 supplement to the CPS. Results indicated that 
various noncomputer job tasks, such as writing memos and reports at work or reading and 
using letters, forms, and diagrams, were associated with wage differentials roughly 
comparable to the computer premium when entered individually into a standard human 
capital wage model, although the computer coefficient remained the strongest when all 
were entered jointly in a single model. Nevertheless, just as one would not conclude that 
there is a wage payoff to letter-reading skills specifically rather than to the occupational 
status or general abilities for which they presumably proxy, the computer coefficient 
should not necessarily be considered an unbiased measure of returns to this specific skill. 
In addition, workers who reported that their computer skills were not good enough for 
their current job did not suffer a wage penalty, nor was experience with computer 
training associated with a wage premium, at least in the cross-section.  
 
Handel (2000) noted further difficulties with the original computer study, 
including that, among specific computer applications, using e-mail received the largest 
additional wage differential beyond the baseline computer premium, whereas 
programming and computer-aided design brought no additional reward; this is hard to 
reconcile with the notion that the different coefficients reflect returns to the respective 
human capital requirements of these tasks. In addition, the growth of earnings inequality 
between 1979 and 1993 was concentrated in the early 1980s, and nearly half of that 
growth occurred during the high unemployment period 1981–83, whereas inequality 
changed little in the 1990s; this timing seems more related to macroeconomic conditions 
than to the diffusion of IT. In addition, comparing measures of inequality for 1984 and 
1989 after statistically adjusting computer use in the 1989 CPS sample to 1984 levels 
accounted for little of the growth of earnings inequality in that period (Handel 2000). 
 
The literature discussing the computer wage premium assumes that computer 
skills are scarce and expensive. The prevailing assumption seems to be that workers must 
adjust to technology as though it were an external force. However, this assumption 
represents only part of the picture because it is in the nature of computer product markets 
that the technology must adjust to users. However complex they may be internally, 
equipment and software that are hard to use are at a competitive disadvantage. If word 
processing software required users to have skills comparable to programming in 
FORTRAN or C, there would be far fewer word processors. The competitive advantage 
of usability drove the development of the graphical user interface, whose icons and pull-
down menus replaced arcane commands with pictures. There are some complexities to 
the process, notably the tendency for software to become feature-rich, hence more 
complex, even as core functions are simplified. Still, one should not assume that high 
technology necessarily demands high skill requirements. Inevitably, there is some kind of 
mutual adjustment between vendors and users (Handel 2000).  
 
As with DiNardo and Pischke (1997), a study using the Canadian General Social 
Survey (1994) found a computer premium similar to that found by Krueger (1993), but 
the study also revealed that use of a fax machine was associated with a larger and more 
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robust wage differential than use of a computer. Because it is unlikely that the use of fax 
machines had such a strong effect on skill requirements, the authors also question 
whether the computer use premium can be taken at face value (Morissette and Drolet 
1998). 
 
Research using the British National Child Development Study of those who were 
33 years old in 1991 found that the use of tools at work normally associated with manual 
labor is not a robust predictor of wages in a standard wage regression that also includes 
occupation, industry, firm size, and math and reading test scores, whereas the computer 
premium remains significant (β = 0.07, t = 4.01). A variable measuring whether 
individuals have gotten "better in using a computer to solve problems or give 
information" in the past 10 years is also associated with a wage premium in the same 
model (β = 0.031, t = 1.91), leading the authors to argue with Krueger that the results 
reflect rewards for computer skills specifically. The percentage of the working day 
employees spend at a computer is also associated with higher wages (β = 0.058, t = 2.89) 
(Arabsheibani and Marin 2000, p. 14).  
 
Another British study using a nationally representative sample, the Skills Survey 
of the Employed British Workforce (1997), found that four levels of complexity of 
computer use—simple, moderate, complex, and advanced (Green 1998, pp. 10 f.)—are 
generally associated with successively higher wage premiums, with the lowest level 
receiving a 4–7 percent differential depending on gender and the most advanced 
receiving a 15–20 percent differential after controlling for other specific job skill 
requirements, establishment size, and standard human capital variables. The author 
acknowledged, however, that these results do not settle the question of whether computer 
use causes higher pay or is associated with other unobserved variables that affect pay 
(Green 1998, p. 14). 
 
Indeed, frequency of computer use at work is associated with successively higher 
wage premiums in the CPS (1991) for the United States, but the same relationship is 
found for other job task measures with implausibly high premiums, such as reading 
letters at work. This finding may merely indicate that some unobserved characteristics 
that are associated with higher wages are also associated with more frequent or complex 
use of computers (Handel 2000). 
 
By contrast, a Dutch study used panel data on a cohort that was age 53 in 1993 
and found that the size of the computer wage premium was not consistently greater for 
those who use computers at work more often when added to a standard wage equation 
that also includes an IQ measure. This study also found that wage growth between 1983 
and 1993 was not consistently associated with intensity of computer use in 1993 
(Oosterbeek 1997).  
 
A British study using repeated cross-sections for 1986, 1992, and 1997 found that 
job skill demands, as measured by employee reports of the level of education, training, 
and on-the-job experience required for their jobs, rose during this period. Computer use 
is strongly associated with these indicators in a model that pools all years and controls for 
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only establishment size and industry; previously significant year dummies become 
insignificant when computer use is added to the model (Green, Felstead, and Gallie 
2000). However, the sparse use of control variables, including the absence of 
occupational controls, makes these results difficult to accept at face value. 
 
Because of the concern over the possible spuriousness of measured returns to 
computer use, other studies have attempted to more effectively control for possible 
confounding variables.  
 
Black and Lynch (2000) used panel data from two waves of the National 
Employer Survey (NES) (1993, 1996) to estimate fixed-effects models for employing 
establishments that control for unobserved time-invariant establishment characteristics. 
The survey excluded establishments with fewer than 20 employees, and the study 
restricted analysis to the roughly 250 manufacturing establishments with data on all 
variables for both years, but it was otherwise representative. Black and Lynch found that 
the proportion of nonmanagers using a computer is associated with a 15 percent wage 
premium for production workers in the 1996 cross-section, but the effect disappears 
entirely in the fixed-effects model that uses changes in the percentage of workers using a 
computer to predict changes in average wages within establishments (Black and Lynch 
2000, tables 3 and 4). 
 
Results in Cappelli and Carter (2000) are more favorable to the computer 
premium thesis. They found that first difference models using the NES panel data yielded 
few significant effects for various predictors, and they inferred that the method 
exacerbates measurement error from both survey waves. They pooled the data for both 
years for all industries and found that the percentage of nonsupervisory workers using 
computers is significantly associated with production worker wages but that the 
percentage of managerial and supervisory workers using computers shows almost as 
strong a relationship with production worker wages. The same pattern is found for a 
number of other occupations, and the proportion of computer users among production 
workers actually has a stronger effect on the pay of managers and professionals than 
computer use in their own occupation (Cappelli and Carter 2000, pp. 19, 21). However, 
given the large number of establishment-level controls, they concluded that "the higher 
wages [among computer users] are not simply an artifact of unobserved firm 
characteristics" (Cappelli and Carter 2000, p. 23). 
 
Hamilton (1997) argued that because those with computer skills are not drawn 
randomly from the wider population but may have some additional unobserved 
characteristics associated with higher wages, researchers cannot generalize observed 
computer wage premiums without controlling for possible selection effects. The High 
School and Beyond Survey (1986) has data on computer skills, such as whether 
respondents ever used word processing, spreadsheet, and other common software 
applications as well as whether they had written programs in FORTRAN, COBOL, or 
other advanced computer languages. The sample was restricted to males graduating from 
high school in 1980 who worked more than 20 hours per week.  
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A standard wage regression finds a computer premium roughly in the 5–10 
percent range among whites and almost double that among blacks. Including math and 
verbal test scores does not significantly affect the size of the computer skill premium 
when added to a standard wage regression. To control for possible selection effects, 
Hamilton also estimates the model after including predicted values from a selection 
equation that estimates the probability of acquiring computer skills using variables for 
whether the respondent thought math was interesting or useful when surveyed in high 
school and whether his family owned a pocket calculator when he was growing up as 
well as the predictors from the wage regression. In these models, hourly wages were 25 
percent higher for workers with computer skills when measured as knowledge of word 
processing and other common applications and 13 percent higher when skills were 
measured by high-level programming knowledge, although the gap is slight for college 
graduates (Hamilton 1997, table 5). As with Krueger's earlier results, it is not clear why 
knowledge of programming fails to confer substantially greater advantages than 
knowledge of common applications if the wage premium reflects relative levels of human 
capital. 
 
Friedberg (2001) used instrumental variables to test whether the human capital 
requirements for learning how to use computers were sufficiently great that some older 
workers retired earlier than they would otherwise rather than undertake the necessary 
training. She noted that the narrow variation in computer use rates for those ages 25–53 
suggests that people acquire computer skills as needed for their jobs, regardless of 
whether they had prior experience with computers, for example, in school (Friedberg 
2001, pp. 7 f., 20). This finding suggests that early retirees may have chosen to forgo 
computer training because they had already decided to retire, not because acquiring the 
necessary skills was too difficult.  
 
However, Friedberg (2001, p. 13) believed that the decision not to undertake 
computer training causes some workers relatively close to retirement to retire earlier than 
they otherwise would have. Results from an initial ordinary least squares model indicate 
that workers ages 50–62 in 1992 who used a computer at work were 2.2 percentage 
points less likely to retire 4 years later, but this does not disentangle the two types of 
causal effects. When average computer use among prime-age workers in the same 
occupation and industry is entered as an instrument to simulate the exogenous 
introduction of computers, Friedberg found that using a computer at work makes 
someone 6.6 percentage points less likely to retire and delays retirement by about 8–12 
months (Friedberg 2001, pp. 17 f.). Friedberg's results seem a bit paradoxical: She 
acknowledged that the lack of an age gradient in computer use for prime-age workers 
suggests that computer skills are easily acquired, yet she also tried to show that they 
require sufficient human capital investment as to be a meaningful source of early 
retirement. Other data and case study reports also suggest that older workers have a 
harder time adjusting to the arrival of computers, but the number of early retirements 
seems small and is presumably a transitory problem given the increasing diffusion of 
computers (Zuboff 1988, p. 74). 
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One of the most unusual studies used a sample of roughly 600 identical twins and 
found that the strong effects of computers on wages in a standard regression model 
disappears once the effect is estimated from the variation in computer use within twin 
pairs, which controls for common family background and ability variables. The author 
concluded that "computers in the workplace do not themselves create a wage premium 
for a given worker; instead, the results indicate that more able workers tend to work at 
jobs which require the use of a computer" (Krashinsky 2000, p. 11). 
 
Use of employee-level panel data, such as Oosterbeek's (1997) study, described 
above, is generally considered the best way to control for stable individual 
characteristics. There are individual studies for the United States, United Kingdom, 
France, and Germany.  
 
Johnson (2002) analyzes wage growth for a three-wave panel of former welfare 
recipients in an urban Michigan county for 1997–99. In cross-sectional analyses, 
computer users earn 8 percent more than nonusers when they start using a computer and 
an additional 3 percent with each additional year of experience using a computer. 
However, in a first-difference model, both coefficients are insignificant, suggesting that it 
is not computer use or skill per se that is rewarded but other, unobserved worker 
characteristics that are associated with computer use. By contrast, other variables, such as 
reading and writing use on the job and keeping close watch on gauges, dials, and 
instruments, are associated with even greater rewards in the first-difference model 
relative to the cross-sectional analyses (Johnson 2002, pp. 20 ff.)  
 
Bell (1996) used wage data from the 1981 and 1991 waves of the British National 
Child Development Study and information about computer use at work from the 1991 
wave for those who were 33 years old in 1991. Cross-sectional estimates indicated a 
computer premium of about 12 percent after controlling for math and reading test scores, 
industry, occupation, establishment size, supervisory responsibilities, and standard 
human capital variables, among others (Bell 1996, table 5). As with the original computer 
premium study, reported computer abilities are not rewarded if the individual does not 
actually use computers on the job (Bell 1996, table 3), contradicting the view that the 
search for computer wage effects among users is misguided because nonusers with 
computer skills will also receive the premium if they are to be attracted to noncomputer 
jobs. Computer users in 1991 did not receive higher wages than others in 1981, when 
they were 23, which argues against the objection that computer use merely proxies for 
other, more stable individual differences (Bell 1996, table 7). Computer use explains 
about 40 percent of the rise in returns to educational qualifications in the United 
Kingdom, similar to Krueger's estimates for the United States (Bell 1996, p. 15). Finally, 
using a first-difference model of wage growth for those who did not change employers 
between 1981 and 1991 to control for unobserved individual and firm characteristics, 
Bell found that the computer coefficient remains significant but is reduced to about a 6 
percent premium (Bell 1996, table 8). 
 
However, rather surprisingly, the computer premium tends to be similar in 
magnitude to another skill variable that measures whether the respondent is involved in 
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running an organization, group, or firm. Such involvement would seem to require a much 
higher level of skill, and this result is consistent with DiNardo and Pischke's (1997) 
warnings about the trustworthiness of the measured returns to computer use (Bell 1996, 
table 4). 
 
Entorf and Kramarz (1997) analyzed panel data from the French Labor Force 
Survey (1985–87), which contains detailed information on technologies used in the 1987 
wave and can be matched with data on firm characteristics. Most employees are using 
new technologies the authors classify as allowing autonomy (e.g., microcomputers), and 
they receive a 16 percent premium in a cross-sectional wage equation, which declines to 
about 4.5 percent for those with 6 years of experience with the technology when 
preexisting individual characteristics are controlled in fixed-effects models; inclusion of 
firm characteristics does not significantly alter results. Smaller numbers of workers using 
technology classified as not involving autonomy (e.g., robots or numerically controlled 
machine tools) do not receive any premium (Entorf and Kramarz 1997, pp. 1494 ff.).  
 
Entorf, Gollac, and Kramarz (1999) updated these results using a 1993 
supplement to the Labor Force Survey on new technology use. They found that cross-
sectional estimates of the returns to computer use of 15–20 percent fall to 2 percent after 
1–3 years of experience with computers and then to zero when longitudinal data are 
incorporated into models. Computer users are better paid than nonusers, but they were 
better paid even before they began using computers. As with the earlier survey (Entorf 
and Kramarz 1997), the inclusion of firm fixed effects has little effect on results (Entorf, 
Gollac, and Kramarz 1999, p. 476). 
 
Again, some anomalies appear with specific estimates. The 1987 cross-sectional 
premium for microcomputer use (β = 0.071) is similar in size to the premium for using at 
work an early and primitive French version of the Internet called Minitel (β = 0.069), 
which did not require significant training and was distributed by the French government 
to any household requesting it. Using a fax machine is associated with a somewhat 
smaller but still significant premium (β = 0.037), whereas using a robot or numerically 
controlled machine is not associated with any significant wage differential, although 
these results may reflect the fact that only about 1 percent of the sample used each type of 
technology (Entorf and Kramarz 1997, pp. 1497, 1506; Entorf and Kramarz 1998, pp. 
178, 192). These results are somewhat stronger in the 1993 data, with significant 
coefficients for computer use (β = 0.0979), fax machine use (β = 0.1204), and Minitel use 
(β = 0.0470), but no significant effect for robot use (β = 0.0249) (Entorf, Gollac, and 
Kramarz 1999, p. 475). 
 
The German Socio-Economic Panel has information on computer use at work for 
1997. Cross-sectional results using a standard human capital model indicate a 7 percent 
computer wage premium, but fixed-effects models estimate a computer wage premium in 
the range of 1–2 percent (Haisken-DeNew and Schmidt 1999). 
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In general, this literature is inconclusive regarding the existence of a genuine 
computer wage premium or the difficulty level of the new skills introduced by computers 
in the workplace. 
 
Alternative Explanations and Econometric Evidence on the 
Links Among Computers, Skills, and Wages 
 
The confused state of the evidence and interpretation regarding the computer 
wage premium led others advocating the SBTC thesis to propose different mechanisms 
by which computers and IT might increase the demand for and wages of skilled labor. 
These theories are not as easily stated as Krueger's original thesis; i.e., computers affect 
wages and inequality because of the specific training and knowledge needed to operate 
them. Many of the theories discussed in the following sections are implicit or not 
discussed in depth in the relevant works. One can tease out of the literature the following 
possible explanations for why computers increase the demand for skill, which need not 
be mutually exclusive. 
 
(1) Direct impact of computer use through computer-specific human capital (within 
occupations). The equipment and software are difficult to learn (Krueger 1993). 
 
(2) Direct impact of computer use through general human capital (within occupations). 
Equipment and software may not be complex, but computer use requires more cognitive 
skills, especially in jobs for less-skilled workers, because computers:  
 
• Replace the demand for physical sensing, tacit skills, and intuition with 
demand for greater literacy and more abstract, formal, and procedural 
reasoning skills.  
• Replace jobs with narrow responsibilities with jobs with broader 
responsibilities, which requires an understanding of the interrelationships 
among integrated production systems, greater general cognitive or conceptual 
skills, intellectual flexibility, and systems thinking.  
• Encourage employers to delegate to less-skilled workers conventional tasks 
that previously were bundled into more-skilled jobs, such as elementary 
bookkeeping for secretaries or inventory recordkeeping for forklift operators.   
• Encourage employers to structure work more thoroughly in ways that give 
front-line workers training in and responsibility for broader and more varied 
job tasks, quality control, problem-solving, and decision-making as part of 
new participative management techniques, often called high-performance 
work practices (Hirschhorn 1984; Zuboff 1988; Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson, and 
Hitt 1999, 2002; Siegel 1999; pp. 19 f.; and Fernandez 2001).  
 
(3) Indirect impact of computerization through general human capital (within 
occupations). Computers may require more general cognitive skills because they increase 
the overall quantity, variety, and complexity of information for all types of jobs in ways 
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unrelated to the operation of computers themselves. A computerized work environment 
may raise the skill demands of tasks performed by computer users and nonusers alike 
(Autor, Katz, and Krueger 1998; Autor, Levy, and Murnane 2000). 
 
(4) Indirect impact of computerization through job creation and displacement (between 
occupations). IT may alter the demand for skills through changes in the occupational 
distribution by either: 
 
• Creating more jobs at the top and in the middle of the skill hierarchy—not 
simply technicians and IT professionals who install, maintain, and manage the 
systems themselves, but also non-IT professionals who analyze and act on the 
information generated by the systems (e.g., accountants and production 
planners); or  
•  Destroying jobs at the bottom through automation (e.g., factory robots 
replacing assembly line workers or optical character recognition technology 
replacing data entry workers) (Berman, Bound, and Griliches 1994; and 
Danziger and Gottschalk 1995, p. 141). 
 
The first explanation is the one implied most strongly by the computer wage 
premium literature discussed previously. The second specifies alternative mechanisms; 
however, because they imply skill effects for computer users specifically, any test would 
presumably involve the same types of models and issues found in Krueger (1993) and 
those responding to his work. In other words, they imply different interpretations of the 
computer wage premium but a computer wage premium nonetheless; they offer an 
alternative interpretation of computer wage models and their coefficients but not an 
alternative underlying model or specification. The third explanation is much more 
distinct but also more difficult to test because it posits a contextual effect and the causal 
mechanisms are harder to specify. This model implies action at a distance; a 
computerized environment affects job demands regardless of whether one uses a 
computer and the level of one's involvement with computers. Direct computer use at 
work is incidental to the model. The introduction of computers in a firm seems to put 
more information and job complexity in the air, as it were, affecting diffusely all kinds of 
jobs although, as will be shown, some try to pin down the source of such effects more 
specifically. The fourth explanation is different from the others because it specifies 
various between-occupation skill shifts rather than within-occupation shifts. 
 
Although not every study can be assigned neatly to a single framework of 
explanation, the discussion below is organized according to these categories. Because the 
previous section covered the first class of explanations, which might be called the direct 
impact of computers through computer-specific human capital, this discussion covers the 
remaining class of explanations. 
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Direct Impact of Computer Use on Skills and Wages Through 
General Human Capital 
 
Although knowing how to operate a computer in a narrow sense may not in itself 
require great additional skill, certain dimensions or correlates of using IT may demand 
significantly greater cognitive skills, initiative, and responsibility. In this view, it is not 
computer-specific training per se that introduces significant new skill demands but the 
increased general intellectual or human capital requirements that often accompany 
computer-based work. 
 
Drawing conclusions from eight case studies conducted in diverse work settings 
in the early 1980s, Shoshana Zuboff (1988) argued that blue and white collar workers 
using precomputer technologies learned by doing, and their knowledge was often tacit, 
intuitive, experience-based, and concrete, in the sense that it was hard to state explicitly, 
known in "one's bones," and context-bound. By contrast, she argued that work with 
computers and other IT requires knowledge that is explicit, formal, abstract, conceptual, 
and often learned through formal instruction, seminars, or classes. In Zuboff's view, 
computers involve the manipulation of symbols rather than physical objects, and this 
requires a new way of thinking at work.  
 
These case studies suggested that factory work increasingly involves 
programming, monitoring, and remotely controlling stand-alone machines and integrated 
processes, often in separate rooms with little direct sensory contact with the physical 
process. Back-office work no longer involves processing paper records but working with 
computer databases organized according to an intangible, abstract structure and governed 
by abstract codes and commands. Information is recorded more quickly and can 
automatically trigger other operations (e.g., mailing a check) that can be hard to reverse. 
Workers are under increased pressure for accuracy and greater demand for concentration 
and attention to detail. Even managerial and professional tasks, such as judging 
creditworthiness for a loan, which formerly involved intuition and interpersonal skills, 
now rely more on impersonal data and computer models. Many more managers use 
computers to review operational details, access and analyze data, and generate reports. IT 
also permits firms to expand the scope of their products and customize goods and 
services, and this increased novelty can also create a demand for more intellectually 
flexible labor. 
 
In this view, work in the computer era involves more information management 
among all types of workers. Workers face new demands for memory, attention and 
concentration, procedural reasoning, foresight, formal knowledge, conceptual maps, and 
systems understanding of underlying processes and interrelationships. As one 
government report claimed, "higher level problem-solving skills have almost certainly 
increased in value with the availability of computers" (Executive Office of the President 
1996, p. 202).  
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In addition, because all workers now have at their fingertips information that 
previously was difficult to assemble and restricted to managers, they can now track 
output and quality statistics and conduct their own investigations to improve processes or 
add value. The flexibility of computers allows for rapid adjustment to changing market 
conditions, but only if those close to operations are given the skills to perform functions 
previously divided into separate jobs and the authority needed to make quick changes. 
Firms with hierarchical cultures may still refuse to allow workers free access to or use of 
data, but the cost of excluding workers from decision-making roles rises with the 
availability of computers (Zuboff 1988). Thus, firms are experiencing pressure to 
restructure the workplace to delegate more responsibility and initiative to lower level 
employees, sometimes known as "empowerment" or “high-performance work practices.” 
 
However, Zuboff (1988) acknowledged that many of these developments are 
matters of managerial discretion. Computers can lower substantive knowledge demands 
when rules, procedures, and calculations are programmed into the computer system in 
place of reliance on the worker and no significant new skills or role requirements are 
added to a job. Managers can sometimes guard their privileges rather than move to a 
more participative system. In this case, workers become adjuncts to the computer system, 
minding the equipment or performing repetitive data entry. For Zuboff, although 
computer technology makes a high-performance work philosophy more rational, 
managers who fear loss of power and control may limit the potential skill-upgrading 
impacts when they implement new systems. In Zuboff's view, nothing is inevitable about 
the relationship between computers and meaningful skill upgrading. Technology and 
work co-evolve with other social and institutional factors that affect the specific direction 
change will take. 
 
Recently, a number of studies have adopted Zuboff's (1988) more optimistic 
predictions and tried to test them in the context of the debate over SBTC and earnings 
inequality. Because these studies do not use the four-point framework of SBTC described 
above, many include information on the difficulty of learning computer systems in the 
narrow sense, the role of computers in increasing the information content of noncomputer 
jobs, and the effects of computers and automation on patterns of job creation and 
destruction (i.e., between-occupation shifts). 
 
Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson, and Hitt (1999, 2002) matched information on 
organizational structure, practices, and labor force characteristics from a cross-sectional 
sample of 400 large organizations covering 1995–96 with panel data on computer capital 
in these organizations for 1987–94. They found that different measures of IT, human 
capital, and high-performance work practices, such as self-managing teams, are all 
positively associated with one another, controlling for Standard Industrial Classification 
(SIC) one-digit industry and firm size. Because IT is measured before the human capital 
and organizational variables, they infer a causal relationship. Some associations, such as 
that between education level and the percentage of workers using e-mail, have a flavor 
similar to those that animated the discussion over Krueger's (1993) results. However, the 
authors interpret such variables as facilitators of more complex communication and 
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decision-making rather than indicators of specific computer-related human capital 
demands (Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson, and Hitt 1999, p. 24).  
 
Because Bresnahan and colleagues argued that IT stimulates thorough workplace 
reorganization, they also argue that "managerial and professional workers who never 
touch a computer have their work transformed" (1999, p. 17). In this sense, their work 
belongs in both this section and the next because it encompasses general human capital 
effects of direct computer use and indirect effects for both users and nonusers. The 
authors conclude that IT caused recent changes in organizational structure and demand 
for human capital and that this "technological change shows no sign of abating" 
(Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson, and Hitt 1999, p. 35). However, as noted above, inequality 
growth did abate in the 1990s, contradicting this implication of the SBTC thesis. 
 
One of the most thorough studies in this vein, which also suggested that 
computers had indirect skill upgrading effects on users and nonusers as well as direct 
effects on users, is Fernandez's (2001) longitudinal study of a unionized food processing 
manufacturing plant. The company closed an antiquated plant and built a highly 
automated, state-of-the-art facility that became operational in 1993 while guaranteeing 
employment and current nominal wage levels for the nearly 200 hourly production 
workers from the old plant. Aside from attrition issues, this study circumvented some of 
the problems of unobserved ability bias in the literature stimulated by Krueger (1993) 
because the change in production technology is more purely exogenous. 
 
In the new plant, operations once performed manually, such as pouring 
ingredients into stand-alone machines, were replaced by automated and computer-
controlled materials flow and cooking processes, monitored and directed by operators in 
an air-conditioned control room sitting in front of computer terminals. Management 
explicitly gave operators more training, autonomy, discretion, decision-making authority, 
data interpretation responsibility, and quality control functions as part of the changeover, 
consistent with Zuboff's (1988) model.  
 
Fernandez (2001) measured job skill demands in both the old and new plants with 
observer ratings using skill measures from the Dictionary of Occupational Titles; worker 
self-reports of education and training requirements and the use of reading, writing, and 
math skills on the job; and analysis of complete sets of documents workers use on the 
job. The evidence indicated greater job complexity in the new plant. Workers reported 
greater use of reading, writing, and math skills after the plant retooling of roughly 0.32 
on a 5-point scale ranging from use "none at all" to "a lot" (Fernandez 2001, table 4). The 
average number of paper documents workers used rose from 2.6 to 10.3, not counting 
computer screen forms. Many paper forms are generated from computer data on output 
levels and quality and thus are attributable to greater IT intensity.  
 
However, the absolute reading and math demands remained fairly simple, such as 
a shift from requiring only basic arithmetic in the old plant to requiring computation 
using decimals and ability to read a graph in the new plant. And although the increase in 
documents increased the amount of information workers must process, the documents' 
  44
qualitative complexity, as rated using the system employed on the National Adult 
Literacy Survey, seems to have increased only modestly (Fernandez 2001, pp. 14, 21).  
 
Fernandez (2001) estimated that the average training time remained constant at 
between 3 and 6 months under both systems, and worker self-reports also indicate no 
change in training times. Worker reports from the two waves indicated that the formal 
education workers believed their jobs required increased from 10 years to 11.5 years, still 
roughly equal to the average level of education of workers in the original plant. 
(Fernandez 2001, pp. 14 f. and table 3). Although the evidence suggests that skill 
demands rose, the existing workers seem to have absorbed these demands relatively 
easily, with no change in turnover relative to historical patterns nor any change in the 
racial composition (approximately 55 percent minority) despite widespread fears that 
minorities did not possess the skills demanded by high-technology work environments. 
The author acknowledged at various points that the magnitude of the within-occupation 
skill shifts was absorbable and did not require higher levels of formal education for 
production workers (Fernandez 2001, pp. 16, 25, 31, 40 f.). Indeed, Current Population 
Survey (CPS) data indicate that the education levels of blue collar manufacturing workers 
in the overall economy tended to closely track changes in the workforce as a whole 
(Handel 2000, pp. 164, 297). 
 
The percentage of workers who never used a computer in their job declined 
dramatically from more than 83 percent to less than 10 percent after the changeover, and 
the percentage always using a computer on the job rose from about 5 percent to about 29 
percent (Fernandez 2001, p. 22). However, the study did not address whether the skill 
effects of computerization were large or small, especially relative to any pressure they 
may have put on wages. 
 
Fernandez (2001) noted that the increased job requirements were not associated 
with increased average real wages, but wage inequality within the plant increased 
between 1991 and 1994. Most of the growth in earnings inequality was due to the hiring 
of an additional three maintenance electricians at increased wages that better matched the 
market rate and, to a lesser extent, the hiring of an additional six maintenance mechanics; 
that is, small between-occupation shifts and larger changes in occupational rewards. The 
expensive and newly integrated production equipment raised the cost of machine 
downtime and increased demand for maintenance workers. These workers also made the 
most intensive use of computers, including separate systems for machine testing and 
diagnosing, e-mail for work orders, and inventory control, although again, no evidence 
shows how much new skill these systems introduced into maintenance jobs (Fernandez 
2001, pp. 37 ff.). 
 
Comparison of wages for less-skilled workers in the plant with average 
occupational wages from the Department of Labor's Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) 
Local Area Wage Survey for the region during this time indicates that they were 
protected from greater real wage declines in the external market either by the company's 
guaranteed nominal wage floor, perhaps buttressed by the institutional protections of 
union representation, or by the skill upgrading of their jobs, which may have made the 
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guarantee feasible for the firm by raising the workers' value. Either way, Fernandez 
(2001) concluded that wage inequality would have widened further if changes in the 
wages of less-skilled workers had followed the direction of market wages more closely. 
 
Despite the dramatic increase in automation, only one job was totally automated 
away (Fernandez 2001, p. 11). Even with the "massive upgrading" of the production 
technology, the plant had no difficulty maintaining employment at preautomation levels 
and training the existing workforce to use the new technology.  
 
It appears, then, that automation in the new plant did not reduce employment 
levels but shifted the occupational composition and rewards in favor of skilled 
maintenance workers and upgraded the task content of less-skilled occupations to an 
extent that remains somewhat ambiguous.  
 
Although the Fernandez (2001) study is among the most thorough, several 
barriers prevent generalizing from the results. As Fernandez argued, the firm's policies 
dampened any expected effects on wages and employment, suggesting that comparable 
cases would show greater growth in wage inequality. However, the complete substitution 
of a long-outdated plant with a state-of-the-art facility is also a much more dramatic 
change than is typical and suggests that this case should be taken as an upper-bound 
estimate of the effect of IT on changes in skill demands at the plant level. In addition, the 
relatively low frequency of this type of total change at any point in time limits its 
explanatory power of inequality growth at the aggregate level. In other words, this study 
likely measures the greatest skill effects one might expect from IT in manufacturing that 
are likely to be found at relatively low frequencies in the overall population. There is also 
no comparison measure with changes in earlier decades that might address whether such 
change represents an acceleration of past trends. For example, researchers have long 
noted that more-automated plants employ relatively more-skilled maintenance workers 
(Woodward 1965). 
 
Economists Bartel, Ichniowski, and Shaw (2000) and Shaw (2002) conducted 
qualitative case studies of plants in the medical devices (n = 8), valve (n = 5), and steel (n 
= 70) industries. Like Zuboff (1988), they argued that the use of IT in manufacturing 
places more information at the disposal of production workers for rapid decision-making 
and problem-solving and makes it possible and desirable to combine tasks and give 
workers responsibility for a broader segment of the production process. The result is 
greater use of high-performance work practices, such as the decentralization of decision-
making, employee involvement in problem-solving and quality control, team 
organization, broader job duties, and greater training (Bartel, Ichniowski, and Shaw 2000, 
pp. 2, 11 f., 30; and Shaw 2002, pp. 5, 7, 13 f.).  
 
However, the magnitude of these changes in worker skill requirements is difficult 
to determine. The researchers touch on both computer-specific and general human capital 
issues within occupations as well as the issue of automation and between-occupation 
shifts. 
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In many plants, the introduction of IT has meant that work is less physical and 
involves more operation of computer terminals, process monitoring, and troubleshooting, 
while robots, computer numerically controlled (CNC) machine tools, and automated 
production flows do the actual work of handling and transforming materials into 
products. Even in a nonautomated assembly process, computers and chip technology 
have increased product variety and complexity, requiring greater attention to quality 
(Bartel, Ichniowski, and Shaw 2000, p. 13). However, in some cases, computers automate 
some key quality control functions, relieving workers of some inspection and quality 
control tasks, albeit creating new opportunities for other forms of quality control (Bartel, 
Ichniowski, and Shaw 2000, pp. 10, 21, 26 ff.).  
 
In the five valve plants, machinists now program CNC machines, but they note 
that the "sophisticated software" comes with "a simple graphical user interface," and 
"programming skills would take a relatively short time to learn compared to machining 
skills, thus they tend not to be a limiting factor" and are learned on the job (Bartel, 
Ichniowski, and Shaw 2000, pp. 20, 22 f.). Considering the diverse production jobs they 
observed in the different industries, the authors concluded that "[t]he increase in demand 
for computer skills is very modest. New computerized machines are run with graphical 
options that operators can be trained to utilize very quickly." (Bartel, Ichniowski, and 
Shaw 2000, p. 32).  
 
The case of the steel workers, who now work in central computer control rooms 
rather than on the production line, seems to encapsulate their general argument: "While 
some increase in computer literacy is also needed, the critical change in skill sets is being 
able to respond to the new information processes," which involves greater decision-
making responsibility regarding quality control and "fixing disruptions and breakdowns" 
(Bartel, Ichniowski, and Shaw 2000, p. 30). In the steel industry, "[t]he beauty of the 
introduction of computers in the workplace is that the software that integrates computers 
is so good that production workers do not require extensive computer skills…[but] the 
operators now have far more information than they did in the past" as a result of 
computerization (2002, p. 4). 
 
Yet formal education requirements did not rise in any of the plants. Despite 
employer claims that workers must be intellectually flexible, able to be cross-trained on 
different jobs, and have problem-solving, communication, and teamwork skills, the jobs 
still require no more than a high school degree and traditional machinist qualifications in 
the case of the valve industry (Bartel, Ichniowski, and Shaw 2000, pp. 11, 13, 22 f.). 
Even though their educational requirements are unchanged, employers in the steel 
industry are now said to be "looking for an entirely different type of employee," whereas 
previously they did little to screen applicants. But some of the desirable worker 
characteristics cited, such as being responsible and reliable and having a "positive 
attitude" toward hard work and rewards, as well as the others noted above, seem to be 
traditional virtues and unlikely candidates for explaining the large growth in earnings 
inequality (Shaw 2002, p. 8). Shaw acknowledged that the skills "are difficult to observe 
and quantify" (2002, p. 25) and that their magnitude may not be great (2002, p. 23). 
Because these technologies did not increase educational requirements of production 
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workers, they do not seem to be strong candidates for explaining the growth in the 
education premium, at least on the basis of changing cognitive requirements in the 
production workforce. 
 
Although training requirements may have increased in the different industries 
Bartel and colleagues (2000) and Shaw (2002) studied, analyses using CPS training 
supplements for 1984 and 1991 indicated that changes in the incidence of and payoff to 
training in the economy overall do not account for any of the growth in wage inequality 
(Constantine and Neumark 1996).  
 
The research seems to suggest that automation is eliminating less-skilled jobs. A 
number of plants increased output while cutting employment and implementing 
automated processes (Bartel, Ichniowski, and Shaw 2000, pp. 10, 15). However, in the 
valve industry, employment loss extended to skilled machinists, draftsmen who have 
been replaced by three-dimensional computer-aided design and manufacturing 
(CAD/CAM), and even engineers, as well as less-skilled operators who monitor machine 
operations after machinists set them up (Bartel, Ichniowski, and Shaw 2000, p. 23). In 
this case, SBTC is difficult to distinguish from a general reduction in labor requirements. 
The steel industry has used centralized computer controls, sensors, and automated 
materials handling devices to replace jobs that previously involved working on the 
production line to set controls, monitor flows and make adjustments, and handle 
materials (Bartel, Ichniowski, and Shaw 2000, pp. 26 ff.; and Shaw 2002, p. 3).  
 
However, Shaw (2002) did not believe that IT and human resource practices were 
the most important reasons for the decline in labor demand in steel, which suffered a 
wave of plant closures in the early 1980s due to recession, long-term underinvestment, 
imports, outsourcing, and strong wage increases despite weak product demand during the 
recession. Other technological changes specific to the steel industry that reduced labor 
demand in the 1970s and 1980s included the introduction of continuous casters, which 
eliminated an entire stage of steel making, and a shift from integrated steel mills to less 
labor intensive steel minimills (Shaw 2002, pp. 19 ff.). Shaw noted that production 
worker wages in steel have remained virtually unchanged despite the introduction of IT 
and new human resource practices, and, consistent with Harrison and Bluestone's (1988) 
deindustrialization argument, she believed that the loss of highly paid manufacturing jobs 
played a greater role in the growth of inequality than IT (Shaw 2002, pp. 24 ff.).  
 
Economists Levy, Beamish, Murnane, and Autor (1999) conducted a qualitative 
study of how onboard computers, computer testing and diagnostic equipment, and the use 
of microcomputers for databases and training affect the skill requirements of auto repair 
workers. They followed Zuboff (1988) in noting that the work becomes more abstract. 
One cannot learn how microelectronic systems operate or detect most faults through 
simple listening, observation, or learning by doing, as with mechanical systems. The job 
requires some new, formal knowledge of electronics (Levy et al. 1999, pp. 12, 15). 
Embedded microelectronics and greater overall complexity of vehicle systems increases 
the number of manual pages, diagrams, test operations, and level of abstract reasoning to 
be performed.  
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The researchers gave no detailed estimate of the level of training required for 
these new tasks, but a senior trainer at a regional training center operated by the 
manufacturer found that many auto technicians, often middle-aged, had problems reading 
or understanding the invisible logic of electronic circuitry. However, this finding may 
have been a transitory generational problem, and because the training courses lasted only 
a few days, the extent of the additional requirements is unclear. Nevertheless, the 
introduction of computers into auto repair requires greater reading and some new 
technical knowledge—basic electronics—from higher-level auto repair workers (Levy et 
al. 1999, pp. 20 ff.). Lower level technicians who handle more routine jobs, such as brake 
replacements and tuneups, do not work with electronic systems and are unaffected by 
computerization (Levy et al. 1999, p. 29). The study contains no breakdown of the 
relative numbers of higher and lower level technicians. Analyses of decennial census 
(1960–90) and CPS (1971–91) data indicate that growth in educational attainment for 
auto technicians has been no faster than the overall average for all workers, even during 
the 1980s, when computers and microelectronics were introduced into automobiles 
(Handel 2000, pp. 146 f.). 
 
Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2000) studied the consequences of introducing a 
check-imaging system for back-office jobs in two departments of a large bank, routine 
deposit processing and exceptions processing. A state-of-the-art system installed in 1994 
included optical character recognition (OCR) to scan handwritten checks and deposit 
slips to verify that the check amounts correspond to the total recorded on the deposit slip. 
By 1999, the system successfully read about 57 percent of all checks. A digital camera 
also photographs the checks. 
 
The routine deposit department operates the OCR system and also employs data 
entry clerks who receive the digital images and enter information in case the OCR system 
cannot read the handwritten amounts. Once the OCR system or human clerks enter the 
data, the system automatically verifies that the check amounts and deposit slip total are 
consistent (Autor, Levy, and Murnane 2000, p. 8). If the two amounts do not match, the 
problem is sent to an "image balancer" in the department who examines the check and 
deposit slip images on a computer to resolve the discrepancy.  
 
The human capital requirements for these jobs did not change greatly after the 
changeover; in both periods, most employees were female high school graduates. The 
image balancers had the highest skill requirements, and most of them were drawn from 
the existing workforce and given 36 hours of classroom training and two weeks of 
support from an experienced image balancer to learn the new system, "suggesting that 
modest amounts of training could impart the requisite computer skills" (Autor, Levy, and 
Murnane 2000, pp. 9, 11). The new check-processing technology improved productivity 
by 27 percent between 1994 and 1999 and had the potential to automate many data entry 
clerk positions out of existence. In practice, however, layoffs were avoided because of 
the increased volume of checks processed following the bank's acquisition of another 
bank during this time. However, the authors suspect that improvements in OCR software 
will likely eliminate more of these jobs in the future and will also allow more of the work 
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to be outsourced to offshore data-processing operations. Changing bank regulations that 
permit banks to provide customers with check images instead of the original paper 
checks, to some extent responding to the new IT capabilities, will also likely eliminate 
low-skilled packaging jobs in the bank and filing jobs in corporate client firms in the 
future. The availability of records on the Internet may cut the number of customer service 
representatives as well (Autor, Levy, and Murnane 2000, pp. 12 f., 20). 
 
The exceptions processing department handles issues such as insufficient funds, 
stop payment requests, signature verification for large checks, and possible fraud. The 
imaging technology eliminated previous bottlenecks, such as waiting for boxes of paper 
checks to be delivered from another department.  
 
However, previous reorganization of the workplace appeared to have a more 
significant impact. Previously, different exceptions processors specialized in handling 
each type of problem, even though they were often interdependent in real situations and 
the narrow scope of each function hindered cooperation. The bank used the impending 
arrival of the new technology in the following year to reorganize the work along lines 
described by Zuboff (1988), giving workers responsibility for entire accounts, training 
them to solve all types of problems, and providing them with a more holistic 
understanding of the work process and customer needs. This reorganization accounted for 
two-thirds of the productivity gains between 1994 and 1996, and the new technology 
accounted for the remaining one-third. In total, the number of exceptions processors 
declined by 28 percent, from 650 to 470, achieved through attrition owing to a 30 percent 
annual turnover rate (1994–96). The bank promoted workers by one pay grade, 
increasing their wages from $10.64 to $13.50 (27 percent) in 1998 dollars, after they 
completed 40 hours of classroom training and 40 hours of on-the-job training to learn the 
different types of exceptions processing. The pay range was also widened in recognition 
of the increased skills required and scope for individual initiative, suggesting greater 
potential inequality within the occupation (Autor, Levy, and Murnane 2000, pp. 15 ff.). 
 
The changes were partly reflected in stricter hiring standards. Computer skills 
were relatively easy to teach, but the reorganization of production required a more 
holistic or systems-level understanding of the different steps in exceptions processing and 
their interrelations. The greater weight placed on conceptual abilities, initiative, and 
problem-solving led to greater recruitment of college graduates, whereas previously most 
exceptions processors had been high school graduates, according to bank managers 
(Autor, Levy, and Murnane 2000, pp. 14, 19). The study presented no firm-level or CPS 
evidence on trends in the education of bank clerical workers that would test this 
conclusion more formally. 
 
Autor et al. (2000) concluded that IT has the potential to automate routine low-
skill jobs out of existence and enhance the value of more-skilled workers, consistent with 
the SBTC thesis. However, despite the surprisingly large pay raise, the role of IT in this 
process is ambiguous because so much of the productivity gain can be attributed to the 
earlier reorganization. Even in this case, the training was relatively short, although Autor 
et al. (2000, p. 19) followed Zuboff (1988) in arguing that computers facilitate this type 
  50
of job redesign by consolidating information for the first time in unified databases easily 
accessible to front-line workers. According to this view, working with a computer 
increases the demand for general cognitive skills, such as problem-solving and 
intellectual flexibility, apart from application-specific computer knowledge. 
 
However, another problem in interpretation is that this bank was one of the first to 
reorganize exceptions processing and introduce imaging technology in 1994, which does 
not coincide with the timing of earnings inequality trends. Inequality grew in the early to 
mid-1980s and stopped growing in the 1990s. If this generation of computers represents 
an acceleration of technological change and is representative of other trends in other 
sectors, its effects on the overall labor market are not immediately evident in national 
wage data. Because banking has a long history of computer use and magnetic ink 
character recognition systems, it is also possible that the trends Autor et al. (2000) 
describe represent a smooth continuation of trends in this industry visible across a 
number of decades rather than a qualitative break with past trends. To be compelling, one 
would need evidence of greater technological change in the 1980s than either before or 
since. 
 
Siegel (1999) randomly surveyed 79 large manufacturing firms on Long Island, 
New York, in 1990, which accounted for 85 percent of manufacturing employment in the 
area. He examined the impact on employment of advanced manufacturing technology, 
including CAD/CAM, CNC, robots, automated guided vehicles, and material 
requirements planning systems, but also just-in-time inventory and statistical process 
control techniques. He found that advanced technology is associated with increased 
training, and followup interviews with firms also indicated a shift for production workers 
in the direction of greater use of teams, decision-making authority, broader jobs and 
multiskilling, data processing and analysis, and the use of programmable machines using 
customized software. These findings are consistent with Zuboff (1988) and others who 
claim that IT is associated with increased general human capital requirements, such as 
greater information processing, often as a result of the introduction of high-performance 
work practices (Siegel 1999, pp. 73, 84 ff.).  
 
In addition, Siegel (1999) also found that firms adopting advanced manufacturing 
technology experienced employment losses (–5.8 percent), whereas nonusing firms grew 
(12.8 percent) between 1987 and 1990. The proportion of high-level white collar workers 
grew somewhat, whereas the share of clerical and production workers declined (Siegel 
1999, pp. 67 ff.). The increased share of more-educated workers within industries that 
adopt IT is consistent with the SBTC thesis, although the shrinking employment in these 
industries would mitigate the effect on overall demand for educated labor in the economy 
as a whole. 
 
To test for computers' effect on human capital requirements, Handel (2000, pp. 
155 ff.) analyzed the association between computer use and education using the October 
CPS supplements on computer use (1984, 1989, 1993, 1997). Computer use was 
associated with slightly more than 1 year of education, controlling for gender, race, 
region, and other background variables; controlling for one-digit occupations cuts these 
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estimates in half. Even accepting these estimates at face value, they indicate that 
computers are not typically leading to the replacement of high school-educated workers 
with college-educated workers or even workers with a junior college education. 
Computer use rose about 12 percentage points between 1984 and 1989 (see table 5), the 
only time during the 1984–97 period when wage inequality was still increasing, which 
implies that computers increased the demand for education by about 0.06–0.12 years. By 
comparison, mean education levels actually rose by 0.18 years during this period, 
suggesting that any impact could have been absorbed without generating the shortages of 
college-educated labor assumed by the SBTC thesis. 
 
Even these estimates may be generous. The method just described leads to clear 
biases; for example, word processing and e-mail use are associated with an additional 0.4 
years of education in 1997, whereas the effect of programming is less than half as large. 
When fixed-effects models of the change in education as a function of the changes in 
computer use within occupation groups are estimated, an increase in computer use of 1 
percentage point between 1984 and 1989 is associated with an increase in mean 
education within occupations of 0.002 years. This finding implies that an increase in 
computer use of 12 percentage points would be predicted to increase an occupation's 
mean education by 0.024 years during this period, well below the actual increase of 0.18 
years in mean education. An occupation that moved from having no computer users to 
100 percent computer users is predicted to increase mean education by 0.2 years, well 
below even the lower-bound estimates in the individual-level models. 
 
Finally, when the growth in computer use within occupations for the 1984–97 
period is used to predict changes in within-occupation education for the 1971–76 period, 
a very similar association is present. Occupations with the greatest increases in computer 
use in the 1980s were already upgrading educational levels for other reasons long before 
the diffusion of computers. Therefore, although changes in computer use are associated 
with skill upgrading, the relationship is not likely to be causal. Autor et al. (1998, 
p. 1194) report similar results using their industry-level models. 
 
The message of the studies favoring the SBTC thesis is that working with 
computers involves more intangible, symbolic, and information-intensive tasks, often 
enhanced by complementary organizational changes, but the actual difficulty levels of the 
new conceptual and literacy skills are still unclear. Indeed, studies that focus directly on 
high-performance work practices, such as those described by Fernandez (2001) and 
Bresnahan et al. (1999, 2002), have had difficulty discerning any effect on wages 
(Osterman 1994, 2000; Handel and Gittleman forthcoming), suggesting that the skill 
upgrading is modest. Other studies question the association of computer use and 
increased educational or general human capital requirements. 
 
It seems clear that as microelectronics become embedded in more systems that 
were once exclusively electrical, mechanical, or based on other principles, those who 
must ensure they run properly, such as electrical maintenance workers or auto mechanics, 
will likely need some electronics knowledge. However, the actual additional demand to 
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these workers' training and skills is also unclear, and the majority of jobs involving 
computers do not require knowledge of electronics.  
 
To the extent that these studies posit general human capital effects as a 
consequence of working directly with computers, they also imply conceptually similar 
regression models as the thesis that computer use affects skill demands through 
computer-specific human capital requirements though they posit a different interpretation 
of the mechanism whereby computers affect skills and wages. When computer use 
coefficients are small or insignificant, as in several fixed-effects models described earlier, 
they call into question this view as much as the original view of the computer wage 
premium. More distinctive is the idea, also present in a number of the preceding studies, 
that computers have various indirect effects on general human capital requirements 
regardless of whether workers personally use computers. If these spillover or 
environmental effects affected users and nonusers equally, one would not expect 
indicators of direct computer use to reflect this impact. 
 
Indirect Impact of Computerization Through General Human 
Capital  
 
One of the leading arguments for SBTC claims that computers affect general 
human capital requirements indirectly by increasing the information content of work for 
nonusers and users in ways that are disconnected from the direct operation of computers 
themselves. Almost all of the case studies that focus on increased general human capital 
requirements fail to explicitly specify how nonusers might be affected. To the extent that 
these effects are concentrated among users, one would still expect the user/nonuser 
distinction to be salient even if the interpretation of wage differences between the groups 
no longer relies on the complexity of computer skills per se. Only if the effects were not 
felt disproportionately by computer users would one expect skills among nonusers to rise 
as much as among users and the basic computer wage premium model to be invalid. 
Some possible mechanisms can be inferred from studies reviewed in the previous section, 
such as the increased number of documents used in the automated production system 
Fernandez studied, which seems to have affected workers who did not interface with the 
automated equipment itself, but most research reviewed in this paper takes a more "black 
box" approach and is not explicit about the exact causal mechanism.  
 
After the disappointment with the computer wage premium literature, the study 
by Autor, Katz, and Krueger (1998) attracted the greatest attention among those 
supporting the SBTC thesis of rising earnings inequality. As with Bresnahan et al. (1999, 
2002), they "do not view the spread of computers as simply increasing the demand for 
computer users and technicians, but more broadly as part of a technological change that 
has altered the organization of work and thereby more generally affected the demand for 
workers with various skills" (Autor, Katz, and Krueger 1998, p. 1186).  
 
To test this hypothesis, the authors used CPS data to calculate changes in 
computer use within industries to predict changes in the share of college-educated 
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workers employed within industries to see whether a computer-rich environment (i.e., 
industry) is associated with a greater use of skilled labor. They found that industries that 
increased the proportion of workers using a computer between 1984 and 1993 also 
increased the proportion of college graduates and decreased the proportion of those with 
only a high school degree between 1979 and 1993 (Autor, Katz, and Krueger 1998, p. 
1190).  
 
The problem with these models is that an association between computers and 
more-educated labor need not reflect the presumed causal relationship; the lower price 
and greater availability of computers does not necessarily stimulate employers to seek 
more-skilled employees to use them. A strong possibility exists that both computer use 
and education levels within industries share a common dependence on changes in the 
occupational composition of employment within industries. As noted previously, 
computers are used most often by managers, professionals, and clerical workers; they 
have become standard office equipment. Any increase in office employment will result in 
increased use of computers, as well as telephones, copiers, fax machines, and pencils 
(DiNardo and Pischke 1996). Instead of modeling the demand for different types of labor 
as a function of the stock of office equipment, one can just as easily switch the 
independent and dependent variables using the same data to model demand for computers 
as a function of the changing level of white collar employment, which has increased 
throughout this century, prior to and independent of the diffusion of computers (Handel 
2000, p. 167). Using computers as a predictor of the type of labor demanded requires an 
exogeneity assumption that is difficult to justify. In short, the direction of the causal 
relationship between computer use and a more-educated workforce is unclear. 
 
Autor et al. (1998) tried to rule out reverse causation in two ways. In the less 
successful of these exercises, they found that the effect of average growth in computer 
use in the 1984–93 period predicted as rapid a rate of educational upgrading for 1970–80 
as for 1980–90 and only somewhat slower rates for 1960–70. This finding suggested that 
industries with the greatest increases in computer use during the 1980s were already 
upgrading the educational levels of their workforce for other reasons before 
computerization and that the computer coefficient in the main models may be biased. 
Even if one argues that the variable measuring growth in computer usage between 1984 
and 1993 is picking up a common underlying technological change variable in the 1970s 
and 1980s, the similarity of the coefficients suggests no evidence of acceleration of 
SBTC in the 1980s, whereas growth in earnings inequality was much faster in the 1980s 
compared with the 1970s (Autor, Katz, and Krueger 1998, p. 1194).  
 
In addition, computers had the strongest effect on educational upgrading for 
1990–96, which the authors seem to cite as evidence of an acceleration in the rate of 
SBTC, although earnings inequality stabilized during these years (Autor, Katz, and 
Krueger 1998, p. 1194). Indeed, in a preceding section of this study, Autor et al. (1998, 
pp. 1177 ff.) noted with some surprise that, by their measures, growth in demand for 
college graduates actually decelerated during the 1990s to levels lower than at any other 
time since the 1940s, despite the continued growth of computer investment. This finding 
suggests that if the IT revolution did have a skill impact, it is a thing of the past.  
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In fact, Autor et al.'s (1998) conclusions about the relative roles of supply and 
demand call into question the point of their subsequent computer-skill demand models 
because they showed that, although demand for college graduates accelerated somewhat 
in the 1980s, the deceleration in the relative growth of supply of college graduates was 
much more dramatic and important for inequality growth during this period (Autor, Katz, 
and Krueger 1998, pp. 1177 ff.; see also Katz and Murphy 1992). By this account, 
declining cohort size and stagnating college attendance rates would seem to play a 
greater role than IT. In short, many pieces of the puzzle do not fit together as neatly as 
the SBTC thesis implies. 
 
In a second sensitivity analysis more favorable to the SBTC thesis, Autor, Katz, 
and Krueger (1998) used data from the National Income and Products Accounts to show 
that computer investment per worker in the previous 5 years was positively related to the 
use of more-educated workers in the following decade even after controlling for overall 
capital intensity (Autor, Katz, and Krueger 1998, p. 1197). This finding is stronger 
evidence for a causal relationship, but in similar analyses, Mishel and Bernstein (1998, 
pp. 335 ff.) showed no acceleration in the impact of either computers or capital intensity 
on educational upgrading within industries since the 1970s. 
 
In a broader sense, Autor et al.'s (1998) study is unsatisfying because the causal 
mechanism accounting for the computer-educated labor association was not specified. 
The conceptual models seemed somewhat analogous to tests of neighborhood effects in 
poverty research, which investigated whether neighborhood conditions, such as poverty 
rates, affected individual outcomes independent of individual-level variables, such as 
income. By arguing for a contextual effect, Autor et al. avoided the controversies 
surrounding the computer wage premium literature, which examined the effects of an 
individual's own computer use on the individual's wages. Given the high correlation 
likely between rates of computer use within an industry and individual computer use, it is 
hard to see how the model as specified escapes this problem; an individual-level model 
that includes industry-level rates of computer use while controlling for individual 
computer use would seem to be more appropriate. On a more basic level, it is unclear 
exactly how having computers in one's industry might affect a job's skill requirements 
independent of one's own computer use. Autor et al. do not really explain the association 
they observe between computers and education within industries and why this model is 
preferable to one specified at the individual level.  
 
Fernandez's (2001) work was more concrete and suggested the possibility that 
computers increase the information content of jobs—even jobs that do not involve using 
computers directly—by increasing the amount of paperwork, written documents, and 
quantitative data generated. Computers may also eliminate routine tasks and create more 
complex tasks in which high-skill involvement with computers plays only a small role. 
Finally, computers might increase the demand for more complex or a greater variety of 
novel products within an industry, which would in turn increase the demand for skilled 
labor. 
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In one of the few studies to specify such mechanisms, Levy and Murnane (1996) 
studied a bank's accounting services department, which kept the books for mutual and 
pension funds. Accountants needed to perform only a small set of the tasks taught to 
accounting majors, most of which the bank provided through on-the-job training 
combined with in-house training modules lasting about a week each. The bank recruited 
graduates from local second- and third-tier colleges with quite variable training in 
business and accounting; most of them had little computer knowledge beyond word 
processing, although the banks' software was user-friendly enough to pose little difficulty 
for them. Some bank staff debated whether the recruitment of college graduates for these 
positions reflected a demand for abstract reasoning, intellectual flexibility, maturity, and 
the ability to meet tight deadlines, or whether managers hired people with backgrounds 
similar to their own because they were easier for them to manage. 
 
The growth in the size and complexity of mutual funds, itself driven partly by 
innovations in computer technology that supported greater trading volume and more 
complex financial services products, led to a nearly fourfold increase in employment in 
the accounting department between 1982 and 1993—a between-occupation shift. Levy 
and Murnane also found that computerization within the bank increased the skill required 
within accountants' jobs because routine computational, copying, and data entry tasks 
were no longer performed manually or with adding machines. The more complex aspects 
of the job, such as locating and fixing mistakes and performing more complex stock 
account valuations, now constituted a higher proportion of accountants' work time. 
Training was expanded and formalized into an 8-week, all-day program before 
accountants worked on actual accounts. However, the work remained repetitive and 
stressful, and turnover remained high.  
 
In this case, working directly with computers does not require significant 
computer-specific or general skills, but computers have increased the demand for and 
variety of a service that was always relatively skill-intensive, generating a between-
occupation shift and shifting the job’s emphasis toward complex tasks. Thus, computers 
have had an indirect effect on the skill content of the job quite apart from the operation of 
computers per se. Qualifying this case somewhat is the lack of any apparent increase in 
formal educational requirements for the job, perhaps not surprising because the change 
primarily involved using previously required skills with increased frequency. The 
increased size of the accounting department might be expected to influence the demand 
for educated labor, but the changing character of the work does not seem to have had 
such an effect. Likewise, although the bank’s training requirements appear to have 
increased, analyses using CPS training supplements for 1984 and 1991 indicate that 
changes in the incidence of and payoff to training in the economy overall do not account 
for any of the growth in earnings inequality (Constantine and Neumark 1996). In other 
words, it is not at all clear that the magnitude of the skill shifts within accounting is very 
large or sufficient to explain a significant fraction of the growth in earnings inequality. 
The researchers did not present information on the evolution of the wages paid by the 
firm for this job. 
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Indirect Impact of Computerization Through Job Creation and 
Displacement 
 
Perhaps the most intuitive case for believing that high technology increasingly 
disadvantages the less skilled is the notion that it causes shifts in the distribution of 
workers between occupations; that is, its labor-saving qualities eliminate less-skilled jobs 
while increasing the number of more-skilled jobs. The limiting case in manufacturing is 
the unmanned or "lights out" factory, so named because the manufacturing process is so 
automated that it can be conducted in the dark. Advances in other computer processes 
raise the prospect of similar labor savings in other industries, such as check processing 
(Autor, Levy, and Murnane 2000). 
 
Other examples of between-occupation shifts from studies discussed previously 
include the somewhat increased use of skilled maintenance workers in the automated 
plant studied by Fernandez (2001), the association of advanced manufacturing 
technology with declines in the share of production workers (Siegel 1999), declines in 
production labor in the steel and other industries (Bartel, Ichniowski, and Shaw 2000; 
and Shaw 2002), and the increased use of accountants as a result of the expansion of 
mutual funds (Levy and Murnane 1996). With the possible exception of check 
processing, however, some advocates of the SBTC thesis view the substitution of 
computers for labor as a relatively small part of the computer-induced shift in demand 
toward more-skilled workers (e.g., Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson, and Hitt 1999, pp. 11 f.).  
 
An early study found that computers reduced the numbers of both clerical 
workers and managers within industries between 1972 and 1978, although the effect was 
somewhat larger for clerical workers and was offset somewhat for both groups with 
resumed growth in these groups over time (Osterman 1986). 
 
One of the strongest claims for technological displacement of less-skilled jobs 
came from Berman, Bound, and Griliches (1994, pp. 368, 374), who noted that between 
1979 and 1989, the employment of production workers in manufacturing declined from 
14.5 to 12.3 million (15 percent), while nonproduction employment rose from 6.5 to 6.7 
million (3 percent) and output rose markedly. Using industry-level data from the Annual 
Survey of Manufactures, the authors found that computer investment within 
manufacturing industries was associated with relative declines in production worker 
employment and accounted for more than 40 percent of the change within industries in 
the proportion of the total wage bill going to production and nonproduction workers 
respectively between 1977 and 1987 (Berman, Bound, and Griliches 1994, p. 388). They 
cited BLS case studies that indicated that computers have eliminated production workers 
who performed typesetting in printing and publishing and NC/CNC machine tools and 
robots that have replaced production workers with technical workers and professionals 
(Berman, Bound, and Griliches 1994, p. 390).  
 
International evidence indicated that the share of nonproduction workers within 
manufacturing industries declined in about a dozen industrialized nations in the 1980s, 
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even though the relative wages of nonproduction workers usually rose during this time. 
However, the authors acknowledged that whether this decline represented an acceleration 
relative to the 1970s was unclear (Berman, Bound, and Machin 1998, pp. 1257 ff.). Using 
manufacturing industries as the unit of analysis, the authors correlated increases in the 
share of nonproduction workers across industrialized nations by industry. They found the 
correlation between the United States and five other countries (Sweden, the United 
Kingdom, Belgium, Finland, and Denmark) to be roughly 0.5, but the correlation was 
only about 0.25 or less for the United States and three other countries (Australia, Japan, 
and Austria) for the 1980s. Thus, many of the same industries experienced above-average 
increases in the nonproduction worker share in both the United States and other 
industrialized countries, which the authors interpreted as suggesting some common trend 
in production technology.  
 
Cross-country correlations of within-industry changes between the United States 
and other nations were much weaker for the 1970s, but this was not necessarily the case 
for the correlations among the other countries. Because industry was measured using 
only 28 categories, with a high potential for noise given varying national industrial 
classification systems, the authors argued that the cross-country correlations were strong 
evidence for a common variable, technological change, that decreased the demand for 
unskilled labor within the same industries across nations (Berman, Bound, and Machin 
1998, pp. 1265 ff.).  
 
There are a number of qualifications to these results. As with Autor et al. (1998), 
ruling out reverse causation is difficult. Computers became a standard piece of office 
equipment in the 1980s, and any growth in the white collar workforce would seem to 
require additions to the stock of computers, not to mention desks and office chairs. It is 
not clear that the increase in the availability of computers stimulated the hiring of 
nonproduction or office workers rather than the reverse. 
 
Berman et al. (1994) acknowledged that the recent growth in the nonproduction 
share of employment in manufacturing is not unique. Although the growth in the 
proportion of nonproduction workers seems to accelerate over time, rising 0.05 
percentage points per year between 1959 and 1973, 0.23 percentage points per year 
between 1973 and 1979, and 0.38 percentage points per year between 1979 and 1989, it 
rose most rapidly—0.95 percentage points per year—between 1947 and 1958 (Berman, 
Bound, and Griliches 1994, p. 392). At the conclusion of their study, which made strong 
claims for the importance of computers, Berman et al. suggested that "we avoid 
exaggerating the uniqueness of the computer revolution" (1994, pp. 392 f.). 
 
Indeed, decennial census data for the entire economy show that between 1950 and 
1990, the percentage of operatives and laborers declined at a roughly constant rate from 
about 26 percent to less than 15 percent of the workforce, whereas the percentage of craft 
workers declined from about 14 percent to about 11 percent between 1970 and 1990, with 
no sign of acceleration between 1980 and 1990 (Handel 2000, p. 167).  
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In addition, Howell (1995) noted in an early comment on Berman et al. (1994) 
that nearly all of the shift toward nonproduction workers in manufacturing that they cite 
for the 1979–89 period occurred between 1979 and 1982 (Howell 1995; Berman, Bound, 
and Griliches 1994, pp. 370, 372). Indeed, flatness in the nonproduction share of 
manufacturing employment persisted at least through 1997 (Handel 2000, p. 301). 
Howell further noted that it is hard to understand how computers or advanced 
manufacturing technology could be the primary source of changes in the occupational 
distribution within manufacturing before 1983 and have little effect afterward because 
the National Income and Product Accounts indicate that computer investment in 
manufacturing did not take off until after 1983 (Howell 1997, pp. 14 f.). To meet this 
concern, one would have to estimate the models in Berman et al. separately for both the 
early 1980s and the post-1983 period. 
 
CPS data show a faster decline in the share of operatives and laborers within 
manufacturing between 1966 and 1976 than between 1985 and 1997, and the stability in 
employment share since the late 1980s is also associated with stability in relative hourly 
wages, suggesting a state of equilibrium rather than wage declines propping up 
employment (Handel 2000, pp. 301 f.). 
 
Doms, Dunne, and Troske (1997) used matched data from the Department of 
Commerce’s Survey of Manufacturing Technology (SMT) (1988, 1993), Longitudinal 
Research Database (LRD), Census of Manufacturers (1977, 1992), and the 1990 
decennial census to examine the relationships between technology and worker skill while 
controlling for establishment characteristics such as size, plant age, industry, and the 
capital-to-output ratio. The SMT covers a limited number of industries (SIC 34–38) but 
has unusually rich technology measures, with detailed data on the use of 17 
manufacturing technologies, such as CAD/CAM, NC/CNC machine tools, robots, 
programmable logic controllers, factory LANs, microcomputers on the factory floor, 
automated storage and retrieval systems, automated guided vehicles (AGVs), and flexible 
manufacturing systems. The authors hypothesize that such technologies require greater 
literacy skills, consistent with Zuboff, and skilled support staff to maintain them, such as 
IT professionals, as well as altering the occupational composition more broadly (Doms, 
Dunne, and Troske 1997, p. 260). 
 
In cross-sectional regressions, Doms et al. (1997) found that plants using more 
high-technology equipment also use more scientists and engineers and, to a lesser extent, 
managers and craft workers. These plants also have more-educated production and 
nonproduction workers. However, contrary to Berman et al.’s (1994) study, the 
percentage of nonproduction workers and their share of the total wage bill were not 
associated with the number of technologies used in a plant, although the authors caution 
that this finding may be an artifact of their subsample.5 The presence of technology in an 
establishment was not associated with higher wages for managers and professionals. 
Plants using seven or more technologies did pay higher wages to production workers, 
                                                 
 
5 Only about 350 out of 9,400 plants in the SMT can be matched to LRD and census data. 
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most of which was explained by the production workers' higher levels of formal 
education (Doms, Dunne, and Troske 1997, pp. 262 ff.).  
 
However, it is not clear whether any of the significant cross-sectional 
relationships between technology use and occupational composition, skill, and wages are 
causal or reflect omitted variables, such as firm resources or management quality, that are 
responsible for the observed association. Using matched data for 3,260 plants from the 
Census of Manufacturers for 1977 and 1992 and the SMT (1993), Doms et al. (1997, pp. 
273 ff.) found that the adoption of advanced technologies had no effect on changes in 
nonproduction workers' share of the total wage bill, labor productivity, and production 
and nonproduction worker wages. A separate capital intensity variable was positively 
associated with all except nonproduction worker wages. These results are robust to a 
number of alternative specifications, including models that look specifically at the effects 
of technologies controlling production processes directly (e.g., robots and AGVs) as 
opposed to information-processing technologies (e.g., CAD and, LANs).  
 
Additional analyses indicate that the use of advanced manufacturing technology 
in 1993 had as strong an association with productivity and production worker wages in 
1977 as in 1992 and little or no association with nonproduction worker wages and share 
of the total wage bill in either year (Doms, Dunne, and Troske 1997, pp. 278 f.). Cross-
sectional associations among technology, occupational composition, skills, and wages 
seem to reflect establishment fixed effects rather than the effects of technology adoption 
per se. Plants with somewhat more-skilled and better-paid workers were more likely to 
adopt the new technologies rather than vice versa, and the adoption of advanced 
manufacturing technology did not alter the wage or occupational structures within plants. 
This finding suggests that firm resources or management quality may be the cause of 
both a constant level of worker quality and decisions to adopt technology, whereas the 
association between technology adoption and workers' skills is spurious.  
 
One potential problem with these longitudinal analyses is that they are a sample 
of plants that existed throughout the 1977–92 period. It is possible that plants failing in 
that period would have paid lower wages and employed a larger proportion of production 
workers in 1992 than both technology adopters and nonadopters whereas new plants 
founded after 1977 might show the opposite pattern, which might yield greater support 
for the SBTC theory. 
 
Interestingly, a plant-level measure of computer investment in 1992 from the 
Annual Survey of Manufactures (ASM) was associated with increases in nonproduction 
labor, consistent with Berman et al.'s (1994) industry-level study using the ASM. 
However, the authors acknowledged that these increases may merely show that office 
workers are more likely to use computers rather than that the greater availability of 
computers stimulated the hiring of more office workers (Doms, Dunne, and Troske 1997, 
p. 280).  
 
The causal interpretation is also a bit paradoxical because Berman et al. (1994) 
make clear that the main reason for the growing proportion of nonproduction workers in 
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manufacturing is the large decline in the absolute number of production workers, not the 
small growth in the number of nonproduction workers. Yet one would expect the factory 
automation technologies in the SMT to be the most likely to displace production labor 
because they "are directly used in the production of manufactured goods, whereas 
computing equipment is often a main tool of managerial and clerical labor" (Doms, 
Dunne, and Troske 1997, p. 256). The notion that computers would eliminate large 
numbers of production jobs, whereas factory automation technologies would not, seems 
unlikely. 
 
Taken together, results from Berman et al. (1994), Howell (1997), Handel (2000), 
and Doms et al. (1997) suggest that although the share of production workers in 
American manufacturing declined significantly during the early 1980s recession, the 
evidence is unconvincing that computers and factory automation have been substituted 
extensively for production labor or that computers are responsible for changing the 
occupational composition within manufacturing by stimulating the hiring of large 
numbers of nonproduction workers in manufacturing. 
 
In addition, Doms et al. (1997) found that computer investment is not associated 
with changes in wages for any groups of workers, further weakening the case for a 
computer wage premium; that is, within-occupation skill shifts (Doms, Dunne, and 
Troske 1997, pp. 280 f.).  
 
Although most studies treating between-occupation skill shifts focus on 
manufacturing, others point to the possible effects of automation in the service sector. In 
arguing for the SBTC theory of earnings inequality growth, Danziger and Gottschalk 
(1995, p. 141) suggested some possible sources of automation-driven changes in the 
occupational and skill composition of service jobs:  
 
[Beginning in the 1980s f]irms substituted computers and more-skilled workers 
for lower-skilled workers whose tasks could now be performed more efficiently 
with computers. Insurance companies could lay off file clerks…[and] checkout 
clerks no longer had to enter prices in the cash register. Inventory control was 
simplified and reordering could be done automatically. In these and other ways, 
technology (or automation) decreased the value of the skills of workers with 
lower levels of education and increased demand for workers with more 
education. 
 
However, Danziger and Gottschalk (1995) did not actually investigate whether IT 
has had the labor-saving consequences they suggest. Handel (2000, pp. 177 ff.) examined 
trends between 1971 and 1997 in the proportion of workers in occupations that are likely 
to be most sensitive to technological changes using Current Population Survey (CPS) 
data.  
 
Some trends are consistent with Danziger and Gottschalk's (1995) intuitions. The 
share of clerical workers in banking and insurance held steady in the 1970s and then 
declined from about 50 percent of employment in these industries to 40 percent between 
1982 and 1997, consistent with a smooth substitution of technology for this type of labor. 
  61
Clerical workers' share of the overall workforce declined for the first time in the 20th 
century from 16.9 percent in 1983 to 14.1 percent in 1997, but this decline was 
concentrated mostly between 1986 and 1989 and 1992 and 1997, after most of the growth 
in earnings inequality occurred. 
 
Other trends are not consistent with popular preconceptions. After increasing in 
the 1970s, the share of bank tellers in the banking industry dropped between 1981 and 
1982 and changed little through 1997 despite the spread of automatic teller machines; 
tellers made up 20.6 percent of banking workers in 1971 and 18.0 percent in 1997. 
Despite the increased use of automatic letter-sorting machines, barcodes, and OCR, 
clerks in the Postal Service declined only slightly between 1983 and 1997 and the trend 
represents a deceleration compared with the 1971–79 period. Operators declined 
dramatically as a share of telephone workers between 1971 and 1977, from 21 percent to 
4 percent, but the rate of decline was four times faster in the 1970s than the 1980s and 
1990s. However, telephone installers and repairers declined from 32 percent of all 
telephone workers in 1971 to 17.4 percent in 1997, and this decline accelerated in the 
1980s and 1990s, suggesting that improvements in telephone switching equipment and 
computer-based diagnostics and line repair may have played a role. 
 
The share of cashiers among all grocery workers was no smaller in 1997 than in 
the late 1970s, before the introduction of barcode scanners. Shipping, stock, and 
inventory clerks as a share of workers in retail and wholesale declined faster in the 1970s 
than the 1980s and 1990s despite the emergence and spread of electronic data 
interchange and just-in-time inventory methods. Although many suggest that e-commerce 
and the Internet may eventually automate or replace many types of retail jobs with self-
service (Hecker 2001), computer, communications, and microelectronic technologies do 
not yet appear to have had much of a labor-displacing effect.  
 
Perhaps most surprising, despite the fact that the auto industry is the most 
intensive user of robotics, particularly in welding and paint operations, the share of 
welders and painters in the auto industry increased from 4 percent to 7.6 percent between 
1983 and 1997, despite the presumed direct labor saving impact of these technologies. 
There may be tendencies toward both technological displacement in large firms and 
increased outsourcing to more labor-intensive subcontractors that offset one another. 
Nevertheless, according to both the March and Outgoing Rotation Group CPS series, 
robots and automation seem to have had no overall effect on the employment of welders 
and painters in the auto industry. Decennial census data suggest a modest decline, but 
there is little difference between the rates of decline in the 1970–80 period and the 1980–
90 period.  
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Chapter 8:  Conclusion 
This review discussed several causal paths by which computers might 
conceivably affect the labor market, the demand for skill, and earnings inequality: 
 
• Large-scale job displacement and unemployment.  
• Increased demand for IT professionals.  
• Broad increases in demand for computer-specific human capital.  
• Broad increases in demand for general human capital among computer users.  
• Broad increases in demand for general human capital felt equally among users 
and nonusers.  
• Changes in the occupational composition of employment resulting from the 
automation of less-skilled jobs or the creation of more-skilled jobs. 
 
Whereas the first claim is easily shown to be incorrect, the others are subject to 
substantial controversy. Clearly, research on the effects of IT on employment and work 
remains unsettled. Results that seem to show a strong relationship among technology, 
skills, education, occupation, and wages often appear more fragile on closer scrutiny. 
Many intuitive propositions find only imperfect support in research studies, and there are 
numerous anomalies and contrary research results. The fact that wage levels rose at the 
bottom of the distribution, inequality moderated, and unemployment fell to its lowest 
level in 30 years in the late 1990s, even as IT investment surged and Internet use 
burgeoned, suggests the need for caution in drawing conclusions about the effects of 
computers on the labor market.  
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